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HOW SHOULD WE PUNISH MURDER? 
JONATHAN SIMON 
One of the “law jobs” of the law of murder is to regulate the level of 
“penal heat” produced in society by violent crime and its state 
punishment.  The history of the law of murder in both England and the 
United States can be read as a series of adjustments aimed at ventilating 
penal heat under particular historical conditions with the aim of 
protecting increasingly sensitive democratic political institutions from the 
damage caused by excessive penal heat.  In distinguishing murder and 
manslaughter, and later recognizing degrees of murder and later still the 
potential for early parole release, the law of murder regulated penal heat 
by opening up a field in which both crimes and punishment could be 
ordered in morally satisfying and culturally coherent ways and by 
involving local decision makers, judges and juries, in decisions that 
determined the application of the harshest punishments.  By these criteria, 
the contemporary law of murder is failing, producing a leveling in the 
grading of murder toward a flat and severe level.  Ironically, the abolition 
of the death penalty, long a source of penal heat, is now helping to create 
a dangerous flattening of the law of murder toward the norm of life in 
prison.  The result is a build up of penal heat, which is helping to anchor 
the larger spectrum of punishments for crime at too high a level.  This 
article reviews the history of the law of murder in the United States and 
England from this penal heat perspective, and examines the contemporary 
situation California and England.  The article concludes that criminal law 
can contribute to a rebalancing of our excessive level of punishment by 
self consciously seeking to restore the regulative role of the law of murder. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The law of murder1 is perhaps the most significant place in the 
substantive law of crimes where the practice and purpose of punishment 
in contemporary society becomes a problem both for legislative drafting 
and for judicial interpretation of the law.2  In this article I argue that is 
of more than analytic and pedagogic interest.  The law of murder is, in 
fact, an important device within the substantive law of crime through 
which the overall scale and severity of punishment can be adjusted.  To 
introduce a metaphor I shall return to throughout this article, I argue 
that one of what Karl Llewellyn would have called the “law jobs” of the 
law of murder, is to regulate the penal heat generated by violent 
crime—the often politicized fear of violent crime, and sometimes the 
law’s own response to violent crime.3 
  
 
1. Throughout, I will be talking about both murders and those other highly culpable 
killings that have been treated as manslaughter through various partial defenses to murder, as 
well as by designation of distinct culpable mental states.  For brevity sake I will refer to the 
legal rules governing this upper portion of the somewhat larger category of unlawful killings 
as the law of murder, but I mean to include all highly culpable killings. 
2. LOUIS BLOM-COOPER & TERRENCE MORRIS, WITH MALICE AFORETHOUGHT: A 
STUDY OF THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT FOR HOMICIDE 59 (2004) (“Perhaps as with no 
other criminal offence, discussion about its definition became increasingly inextricable from 
consideration of its penalties.”) 
3. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The 
Problem of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L. J. 1355 (1940).  
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Ian Loader and Richard Sparks use the metaphor of heat to describe 
how the politicization of crime policy over the last decades of the 20th 
century has transformed the conditions under which criminologists 
produce and disseminate knowledge about crime and crime policies.4  
Uprooting that metaphor from that context, I want to suggest that crime 
and crime policies have always generated political heat and that one of 
the key jobs of the law of murder, historically, has been to help adjust 
the temperature.  Mostly, the goal has been to turn the heat down in 
order to protect the political and legal institutions most likely to be 
damaged by the too much penal heat.  Occasionally, the goal of the law 
of murder is to turn up the penal heat when public concerns about other 
kinds of injustice threaten the established order.5  While various 
substantive crimes and their punishments can contribute to the level of 
penal heat, I argue that murder plays a distinctive role—one that has 
become especially important since the 19th century as the most serious 
punishments have been limited in application to the crime of murder. 
From this perspective, the well-known history of the transformations 
in the law of murder in the common law world—the emergence of the 
distinction between murder and manslaughter in the 14th century and 
the creation of degrees of murder in the American states in the late 18th 
century—can be read as a series of adjustments to make it more 
effective as a “radiator” of penal heat.6  The law of murder, in this sense, 
acts a radiator by breaking up the field of criminal killing into morally 
coherent and culturally appropriate divisions, separated and ranked in a 
way that should presumptively parallel the intensity of heat generated 
by killing itself.  It also operates to expand the range of participation in 
the process of differentiation, giving power to judges and to juries and, 
by doing so, channeling some of the heat away from the center of 
government.  In recent decades, however, the decades in which as 
Loader and Sparks note, the climate around penal policy has grown 
 
4.  See, e.g., IAN LOADER & RICHARD SPARKS, PUBLIC CRIMINOLOGY? 63–64 (2011).  
Loader and Sparks argue that, like climate scientists, criminologists now find themselves in a 
paradox where scientific knowledge is seemingly more and more critical to the future of 
societies but at the same time is itself surrounded by public contention.  Id. 
5. Something like this happened in the 17th and 18th century when England added 
scores of new capital offenses to its criminal code in response to increasing social conflict 
generated by the emergence of capitalism.  For a leading discussion of a central episode in 
that period, see EDWARD PALMER THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE 
BLACK ACT 22–23 (1975).  
6. Jonathan Simon, U.C. Berkeley Sch. of Law, Roger Hood Lecture at the Oxford 
Centre for Criminology: No Rationale for the Law of Homicide 5 (May 21, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.crim.ox.ac.uk/lectures.php).  
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markedly hotter, the law of murder has increasingly ceased to operate as 
a radiator by losing its ability to differentiate and distribute and, instead, 
become something more like a “reactor”—a machine that operates to 
recycle and intensify penal heat.7 
For more than 500 years the primary problem punishment posed to 
the law of murder was that of capital punishment and its over 
production.  While murder was hardly the only crime punished with 
death, capital eligibility was one of the chief features of the category of 
“felony” fundamental to both English and American criminal law, it was 
the crime most likely to generate heat both on its occasion and upon its 
punishment.8  Even limited to murder, as capital punishment was in the 
colonies, criminal justice produced more candidates for the gallows than 
society (which means both politics and norms) apparently wanted to 
allow (or grant executive discretion over). 
In England, the historic solution was the crown’s pardoning power 
that permitted a very fine-grained filtering of who actually got 
executed.9  From the penal heat perspective, the heavy reliance of the 
English system on pardoning was a dangerous strategy.  It gave the 
executive center of politics unmediated power to fine tune state killing, 
but also deprived it of the opportunity to channel away the collective 
emotions stirred by crimes and by rituals of state punishment.  
Monarchy was, in this respect, well suited to handle this kind of heat and 
perhaps to redirect it for its own purposes.10 
  
 
7. Id. 
8. Some crimes might be even more frequently punished by death, for example 
“coining” or counterfeiting in 18th century England was one such crime, but coining would 
not have generated as much heat.  See V.A.C. GATRELL, THE HANGING TREE: EXECUTION 
AND THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 1770–1868, at 525 (1994).  
9. To what end the pardoning power was used was, of course, controversial.  For 
information on the pardoning power as a tool of deft class control in the 18th century, see 
generally Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION’S FATAL TREE 
17 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975).  The English case was very different at the end of the 18th 
century because of the continued vigor for executing property criminals in England, a practice 
mostly abandoned in the U.S. (at least for the North) by then.  By the second third of the 19th 
century, however, when after 1830, execution was removed as a possible sanction for most 
crimes, leaving murder the major focus of the death penalty.  See GATRELL, supra note 8, at 
10. 
10. This is Foucault’s important argument about the role of scaffold executions in 
producing the spectacle-based power of monarchical government.  MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 48–50 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon 
Books 1st ed. 1977).  
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In the United States, the already limited scope of the death penalty 
permitted by colonial law and then later by state law was further limited 
by degrees of murder, an innovation first adopted by the state of 
Pennsylvania.11  It was the first great change in the common law world of 
murder since it began to be formulated by Coke and subsequent 
digesters in the 17th century.  Degrees of murder—first and second—
were adopted by most other states.  In a parallel innovation, juries were 
given the power to decide whether or not to impose capital punishment 
even after a conviction for first-degree murder.  From the penal heat 
perspective, degrees of murder were a successful and much copied 
innovation.  This statement is so not just because they opened a channel 
by which most murders could be prosecuted and punished without 
frequent recourse to either executions or executive pardons,12 but 
because they accomplished this reduction through an elaboration of 
meaningful differentiations among killings, and through moving power 
(and heat) farther away from government to the institution of the jury. 
In the 20th century, the law of murder was further recast by the 
introduction of parole, which allowed refinement of long non-capital 
murder sentences based on administrative release procedures.  From the 
penal heat perspective, parole is a major innovation both because it 
allows individualized differentiation in the punishment for murder (and 
other crimes), and because it removes this power to a specialized and 
politically insulated institution and shifts it in time to a period 
considerably after both the crime and the trial.  While often ignored in 
the history of the law of murder, parole clearly influenced the most 
significant effort at reform of the law of murder in the United States 
during the 20th century, the Model Penal Code (“MPC”) first 
promulgated in 1962.13  The MPC eliminated the degrees of murder 
altogether in favor of a complex weighing formula of aggravating and 
mitigating factors to determine capital punishment and parole to set the 
length of prison sentences those cases where death was rejected.14 
  
 
11. See generally Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees 
of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759 (1949).  
12. Both of which were, at the least, politically troublesome, especially when they 
involved sympathetic local perpetrators and victims. 
13. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (1980).  
14. The Model Penal Code defined murder as a felony of the “first-degree,” punishable 
by either death or an indeterminate sentence of life in prison.  Id. § 210.2(2).  
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Today, in many states of the United States and in other nations, the 
law of murder is in need of reform, as it is producing an excess of harsh 
punishment.  California and England shall be my primary examples, and 
while there may be good counter examples in the United States and 
other common law jurisdictions, I propose that we consider these 
examples of a more general problem of penal overproduction afflicting 
much of the common law world.  In both polities (although to different 
degrees and for different reasons), legal principles intended to separate 
murders in terms of severity of punishment have broken down leaving a 
penal response to murder that is too flat and too severe.15  The law of 
murder has increasingly lost its capacity to limit punishment and is 
becoming an anchor of a system of over-punishment. 
Currently, and for the first time in history, it is not the 
overproduction of capital punishment that seems to be overheating the 
penal and political fields.  Indeed, it is the abolition of the death penalty 
in England and Wales in 1965 and its constitutionalization in the United 
States in 1972 (which has greatly reduced death sentences and 
executions from earlier norms) that has helped to produce the 
breakdown by removing the most emotionally charged differentiation 
available to the penal field of modern societies.  For centuries, the life 
sentence has been offered as the most humane and rational alternative 
punishment to the death penalty for the crime of murder.16  But today, 
with the death penalty eliminated in England and largely ineffectual 
even in those states of the United States that retain it outside of a few in 
the South, the life sentence has become the primary vessel for 
channeling the heat of violent crime.  As a result, life sentences (never 
intended to actually last for the entire remainder of a prisoner’s life in 
most cases) have become longer in both England and the United States, 
ultimately (in the U.S.) tending to become whole life sentences.  
Sometimes this takes the form of a mandatory or judicially selected “life 
without parole” (LWOP) sentence, as it is known in the United States, 
or a “whole life tariff,” as it is known in England.  Even where life 
sentences include a parole option, political pressure on parole 
authorities in many states has pushed up actual time served (and in 
 
15. I do not mean to imply that law is the sole or even the most important source of this 
result.  It is, however, one of sources that lies internal to law and is thus a proper target for 
lawyers and legal scholars to take on. 
16. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 92–93 (2002) 
(describing William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England and his adoption of 
Cesare Beccaria’s two-pronged argument against capital punishment, which was published 
almost 250 years ago in 1769). 
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California virtually eliminated the chance of release for most eligible life 
prisoners). 
From a penal heat perspective, this change is producing a flattening 
effect on the law of murder, eliminating the possibility of making a 
range of differentiations and distributing power (and heat) away from 
the centers of government.  In most states, including California, degrees 
of murder remain the law, ostensibly creating a multi-tiered system.  
Depending on its circumstances, an unlawful killing in California can 
range from first-degree murder with special circumstances, which is 
punished by death or life in prison without parole (LWOP),17 to 
voluntary manslaughter with a determinate sentence of up to 11 years.18  
In between these sentences is first-degree murder, with a life sentence 
and a 25 year minimum sentence before parole consideration,19 and 
second-degree murder, with a potential life sentence and a 15 year 
minimum sentence before parole.20  However, in practice, the virtual 
elimination of executions,21 and the dramatic reduction in the portion of 
persons under a life sentence for murder who actually receive parole (to 
far fewer than one percent of the eligible pool annually) means that 
first-degree murder with special circumstances, first-degree murder, and 
second-degree murder, are all punished with life imprisonment with 
little or no chance of release. 
In England (and Wales), life imprisonment has been the mandatory 
sentence for murder since the abolition of the death penalty in 1965.22  In 
practice, the power to release by executive decision (pardon or Parole in 
U.S. terms) and exercised until 2002 by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department assured that actual sentences were far shorter and 
reflected a wide range of factors.23  More recently, however, the 
Criminal Justice Act of 2003 (in response to pivitoal court decisions 
 
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 2008). 
18. Id. § 192(a). 
19. Id. § 190(a). 
20. Id. 
21. Only 13 condemned prisoners have been executed since the current death penalty 
statute came into effect in 1974, leaving nearly 700 prisoners on death row.  Death Penalty 
Information Center, State by State Database, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state 
(last visited May 19, 2011).  
22. THE LAW COMMISSION, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE: PROJECT 6 
OF THE NINTH PROGRAMME OF THE LAW REFORM—HOMICIDE, LAW COM. NO. 304, 9, 19 
(2006), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/lc304_Murder_Man 
slaughter_and_Infanticide_Report.pdf [hereinafter MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND 
INFANTICIDE]. 
23. BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 127–32. 
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discussed below) established a system of guidelines for judges in setting 
the tariff, or minimum sentence before a prisoner under a life sentence 
could be considered for release which codifies a significant shift upwards 
in the length of imprisonment for persons convicted of murder in 
England and Wales.  Under the guidelines the most aggravated murders 
are to be assigned a whole life sentence (meaning, in theory, no parole).  
The most mitigated murders are assigned 15 years (significantly longer 
than previous norms) with an interim category set at 30 years.24 
Thus, despite quite different doctrinal histories, both California and 
England have ended up in a similar place, with less ability to 
differentiate in the severity of punishment among those convicted of 
murder than they had in the past, and a relatively flat and high level 
established as the normal punishment for murder.  In both societies (but 
especially the United States), political leaders have explicitly questioned 
the moral significance of the degrees of murder and promoted the 
justness of this flat and hot approach to murder as an appropriate 
rebalancing of the criminal justice system toward what could be called a 
“victim’s perspective.”25 
The formation of a hotter and flatter law of murder has worrying 
implications for the well-recognized problem of excessive punishment in 
both the U.S. and the U.K.26  The substantive criminal law, especially in 
its high visibility role of grading harmful conduct, plays an important if 
hard to measure role in the moral stability of a society.27  As William 
Wilson has argued: 
 
24. Criminal Justice Act of 2003, c. 44, § 239(7), sched. 19 (Eng.); A New Homicide Act 
for England and Wales? 19 (Law Comm’n, Consultation Paper No. 177, 2005), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/cfinkels/workingpapers/Report%20for%20British%20L
aw%20Commission%20cp177.pdf [hereinafter A New Homicide Act].  
25. The emergence of crime victims as central referent for the criminal law and for 
citizenship more broadly has been identified as a key determinant of mass incarceration.  See 
generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 11–12 (2001); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH 
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND 
CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 8 (2007).  The image of rebalancing criminal justice in favor 
of the victim was invoked frequently by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.  See 
Joshua Rozenberg, Blair Vows to “Rebalance” Justice Towards Victims, TELEGRAPH, June 
19, 2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1397692/Blair-vows-to-rebalance-justice-
towards-victim.html. 
26. GARLAND, supra note 25, at 1–8; see also Tim Newburn, “Tough on Crime”: Penal 
Policy in England and Wales, 36 CRIME & JUST. 425 (2007).  See generally SIMON, supra note 
25; BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN THE AMERICA (2006).  
27. Emile Durkheim, one of the founders of modern sociology, saw punishment as 
anchored in the shared moral assumptions that unify a society.  EMILE DURKHEIM, THE 
DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 62–63 (1984).  
13. SIMON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2011  8:21 PM 
2011] HOW SHOULD WE PUNISH MURDER? 1249 
 
Precise, meaningful offence labels are as important as 
justice in the distribution of punishment. These labels 
help us to make moral sense of the social world—a 
matter of key concern, as society becomes increasingly 
heterogeneous. A criminal provision is better able to 
communicate the boundaries of socially acceptable 
behaviour if it packages crimes in morally significant 
ways.28 
 
Such a flattened law of murder creates a severe and uniform 
punishment despite the widely shared moral intuition that some killings 
are much worse than others.29  The flattening of murder reinforces a new 
morality of law that takes the perspective of the victim as the ground for 
assessing the appropriateness of punishment.  From the victim 
perspective, all killings have the same result of the loss of life—there is 
no moral distinction among them.30  Such a moral revaluation of 
penalties cannot be easily limited to murder, but informs the entire view 
of punishment for crime. 
The disproportionate role that murder plays in the media and 
popular culture reflects its role in ordering our broader conception of 
crime and its appropriate punishment.  Because of its role at the penal 
summit of crime where life is most threatened, murder establishes the 
top of the penal scale.  At the very least, a flat and severe sentence for 
murder has an inflationary effect on the whole structure of punishment 
through adjusting the scale of pricing of criminal penalties overall.31  
Thus, the high price for murder, at the very least, makes it far easier to 
set high sentences for all manner of less serious offenses.  If murderers 
 
28. William Wilson, What’s Wrong with Murder?, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 157, 162 (2007). 
29. Reflected ironically in its support, the death penalty singles out some murders and 
reinforces a widely shared construction that death rows hold the worst of the worst killers.  
See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994).  Naturally, but also persuasively 
many defense advocates retort that it is those with the worst lawyer, not the worst crimes that 
are condemned.  Id.   
30. Some historians of the common law argue that all killing, even in necessity or self-
defense against the assailant, was a felony, with justifications only calling for the King’s 
pardon.  See Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537, 
539–40 (1934). 
31. Behavioral economists have long noted the power of influential price signals to 
anchor expectations about reasonable choices for decisions under uncertainty. See Daniel 
Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 296, 297–300 (1992). 
13. SIMON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2011  8:21 PM 
1250 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [94:1241 
serve ten or twenty years one is not likely to see repeat burglars or drug 
traffickers serving for decades.32  It follows that where murder 
punishments are extreme, there is the potential and perhaps an 
inexorable pull toward more severe punishments for all the lesser 
crimes; and where murder punishments are moderate, the overall array 
of punishments will be moderate. 
In modern society, this price logic is accelerated by a criminological 
logic that extends the threat of murder into the larger structure of 
crimes.  In the past, the law of crimes reflected a variety of social 
functions including the protection of religious values (blasphemy was a 
capital crime), status hierarchies, and property.  In modern society, 
however, the preservation of life has become the overwhelming value 
expressed through the criminal law.  Herbert Wechsler and Jerome 
Michael’s in their seminal analysis of the law of murder, written at the 
end of America’s first great wave of violence in the mid-1930s, captured 
this sense that all of criminal law, and not just the law of homicide, was 
concerned with preservation of human life: 
 
It will be well, in closing this brief survey of the law 
of homicide, to recall that the rules defining criminal 
homicides are not the only rules of the criminal law 
which have for their end or among their ends the 
protection of life.  Even though life is not destroyed, a 
multitude of acts entailing unjustifiable risk of death is 
made criminal by the law governing other common law 
offences, arson, burglary, robbery, assault, battery, 
mayhem and rape, as well as by the general law of 
attempts, solicitation, conspiracy, riot, disorderly conduct 
and the heterogeneous mass of lesser offences created 
because the behavior involved is deemed to be 
dangerous to life or limb.  Indeed, most behavior which is 
inspired by an intention to kill, or is characterized by an 
unjustifiable risk of killing, conscious or inadvertent, 
falls, where death does not ensue, within some wider or 
narrower, more or less specific category of criminal 
behavior, calling for the treatment which may be as 
drastic as that for homicide or as gentle as a stereotyped 
 
32. This might create too much of a squeeze for serious crimes like rape, aggravated 
assaults, and violent robberies, not to mention non-lethal acts of terrorism.  It seems to me 
that very serious crimes can share the same sentence in principle as murder without violating 
the ladder principle (as they did in the era of the common law when death was also a possible 
sentence for robbery, rape, and kidnapping as well as burglary). 
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fine.  Moreover, any provision of the criminal law serves 
the end of protecting life in so far as it makes possible the 
incapacitative or reformative treatment of persons who, 
unless they were subjected to such treatment, would 
engage in behavior threatening life.33 
 
Instances of less serious crimes, such as vandalism, minor theft, or 
drug possession, can be viewed as legal violations calling for only 
modest punishment from either a retributive or a deterrence 
perspective.  However, they can also be viewed as evidence of 
“criminality” for which the present modest offense may be part of a 
potentially escalating pattern of crime whose increase tends toward 
violence and murder.34  Thus, a flattening of the law of murder, 
especially at a severe level, will tend to create pressure to revalue all 
criminal punishments upwards.  Or, to return to the thermal metaphor 
with which we began, the job of the law of homicide is to dissipate penal 
heat through the measured separation of terrible violence into morally 
meaningful substantive crimes, and to link these crimes through a ladder 
principle to the severity of punishment.  When the law of homicide fails 
at that job, penal heat builds up as fear and outrage at the worst crimes 
infects the public response to all crime. 
Mass incarceration might be thought of as the visible symptom of an 
underlying problem in our penal culture.  Just as obesity can mean that a 
person has lost the ability to regulate their own appetite for food, mass 
incarceration is evidence that our collective appetite for punishment is 
out of whack.35  Earlier I suggested a thermal metaphor for this function, 
the law of murder as a kind of radiator.  Here, I suggest a somewhat 
different consumption based metaphor of appetite where murder 
functions as a key anchor for changes in our overall appetite for 
punishment.  The ability of set a proper scale of punishment when it 
 
33. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michaels, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 
COLUM. L. REV. 701, 729 (1937). 
34. This “criminological” view of crime has always been a bit more visible in America, 
largely due to the populist nature of crime policy, compared to Europe where law experts 
have historically had more influence.  See Jonathan Simon, Positively Punitive: How the 
Inventor of Scientific Criminology Who Died at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century 
Continues to Haunt American Crime Control at the Beginning of the Twenty-first, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 2135, 2167 (2006).  Still, the basic dynamic described here applies to all modern societies 
that place life at the center of the values protected by criminal law. 
35. I develop this analogy further in Jonathan Simon, Do These Prisons Make Me Look 
Fat?, 14 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 257 (2010), available at http://tcr.sagepub.com/ 
content/14/3/257.  
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comes to murder is crucial than to establishing an overall sense of 
proportionality for punishment. 
I am not suggesting that the law of murder alone drives over 
punishment in contemporary society.  We know from extensive 
scholarship by now that many features of contemporary U.S. society 
help to drive mass incarceration.36  One of the most important features is 
the political structure of crime policy, which is extremely decentralized,37 
and creates pathological incentives for both individual lawmakers and 
individual prosecutors.38  The U.S. and the UK have also experienced a 
significant increase in economic inequality over the past generation and 
growing insecurity of working and middle class families, and both 
societies continue to struggle with an incomplete resolution of our 
histories of organized racism.39  Many countries, not just the U.S. and the 
U.K., have experienced a long-term crisis of the conditions under which 
liberal governance is carried out that has made government appear 
weaker and less legitimate.40  But while all these factors may contribute 
to the heating up of the crime policy field,41 the law of murder represents 
a unique mechanism within the substantive law of crimes that permits a 
kind of internal effort at homeostasis by dissipating and channeling 
penal heat.  Perhaps only at the margins, a well delineated and 
differentiated law of murder permits a cooling process.  This process 
occurs by describing morally meaningful and culturally resonant 
differences between events that, from the victim perspective, are 
identical, and by creating pathways of responsibility.  These pathways 
channel popular outrage about the legal response to violent crime away 
from the centers of political power and towards judges, parole boards, 
and juries.  Likewise, and perhaps at the margins, our garbled and 
incoherent law of murder contributes to this epic problem. 
 
36. There are so many features of contemporary U.S. society that Michael Tonry has 
usefully described them as risk factors.  See Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, 36 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 13–16 (2004). 
37. See Joachim J. Savelsberg, Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal Punishment, 99 
AM. J. SOC. 911, 919–20 (1994). 
38. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 546–57 (2001); Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation: Recent American 
Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 324–26 (2005).  
39. See generally LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL 
GOVERNING OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009). 
40. David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in 
Contemporary Society, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 445 (1996); SIMON, supra note 25 at 
22–31.  
41. LOADER & SPARKS, supra note 4, at 17.  
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Could this be the right time to look for a major rethinking of the law 
of murder?  The last great recasting of the law of homicide (and the 
criminal law more generally) began more than eighty years ago in the 
scholarship of figures like Rollin M. Perkins42 and Herbert Wechsler.43  
Today we are once again in a time when criminal law theorists are 
returning to fundamental questions about the law of murder.44  There 
are a number of reasons this is a promising moment for such a return. 
First, the law of murder today comes into question in a time of “mass 
incarceration” in the United States, and arguably in England as well.45  
Between the 1930s when Wechsler began thinking about the rationale of 
the law of homicide, and 1981 when he produced his last revised edition 
of the Model Penal Code, the imprisonment rate for the United States 
had changed only modestly from around 130 prisoners per hundred 
thousand free adult residents, to around 154 per hundred thousand (for 
many of the intervening decades it was in decline).  In 2009, the national 
imprisonment rate was leveling off for the first time in decades at 
around 504 per 100,000 free adults.46  Broad agreement exists among 
criminologists that current levels of imprisonment are unneeded to 
control crime, which is at a level much reduced from the heights of the 
1970s and 1980s and that states cannot afford to maintain these high 
 
42. Perkins, supra note 30.  
43. Wechsler seems particularly important, as the primary author of the Model Penal 
Code, the very influential mid-century American Law Institute commissioned effort to 
systematically restate and reform American criminal law.  Wechsler’s approach, modernizing 
the common law around the creation of risk as the principle of grading, began with his work 
(in collaboration with Jerome Michaels) in the mid-1930s on the law of homicide.  See 
generally Guyora Binder, Meaning and Motive in the Law of Homicide, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 755 (2000); Wechsler & Michaels, supra note 33. 
44. See generally CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND 
FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURT ROOM (2003); SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: 
RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER (1998); Guyora Binder, Felony 
Murder and Mens Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 399, 400–01 (2000); Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 965 (2008); Tom Stacy, Changing Paradigms in the Law of Homicide, 62 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1007 (2001). 
45. Mass incarceration is defined by sociologists as a penal regime that is both operating 
at an unprecedented scale and in which imprisonment is applied to whole categories of 
offenders rather than on an individualized basis.  See DAVID GARLAND, MASS 
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1–2 (2001); WESTERN, supra note 26, 
at 12–15. 
46. 2009 marked the first year since 1977 when the national prison population declined 
in absolute (as well as per capita) terms.  See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl.6.28.2009 (2010), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ 
pdf/t6282009.pdf.  England and Wales have also experienced an unprecedented rise in 
imprisonment rates since the early 1990s.  See Newburn, supra note 26, at 427–33. 
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levels of imprisonment, especially as aging prisoners drive up health 
care costs.47  While homicides are down considerably,48 the life sentence 
for murder, and the very long prison sentences that it produces, are 
becoming a major part of that cost in at least some jurisdictions 
(California in particular).49 
Second, there has been a sea change in penal rationales.  When most 
of the modern reforms of the law of murder were developed in the 
middle of the 20th century, the dominant penal rationale in both 
England and California was rehabilitation.  By the 1980s a 
comparatively extreme version of penal incapacitation had emerged as 
the dominant rationale for the law of homicide (and everything else) in 
California.50  England has also increasingly embraced incapacitation as 
the master rationale governing punishment (and especially the 
punishment of murder).  From a penal heat perspective, the dominance 
of incapacitation is critical because it has removed any potential for the 
correctional enterprise to contribute to a cooling of emotions generated 
 
47. See generally MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE 
LESS CRIME AND LESS IMPRISONMENT (2009); Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, 
Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY AND PUB. POL’Y 1, 13 
(2011). 
48. From a high of 9.8 homicides (murder and non-negligent manslaughter) per 100,000 
inhabitants in the U.S. in 1991 to 5.0 in 2009, the lowest figure since 1965.  See SOURCEBOOK 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl.3.106.2009 (2010), available at http://www. 
albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t31062009.pdf. 
49. Recent data from the California auditor’s office underscores this problem.  Out of a 
total correctional budget of 5.4 billion in 2009, health care costs were 2.1 billion, a quarter of 
that on specialty medical needs, with the sickest 1,175 inmates costing an estimated 185 
million dollars in 2009.  See generally CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. AND 
REHAB., INMATES SENTENCED UNDER THE THREE-STRIKES LAW AND A SMALL NUMBER 
OF INMATES RECEIVING SPECIALTY HEALTH CARE REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT COSTS 
(2010), available at http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2009-107.2.pdf.  
50. While California’s primary penal rationale today is acknowledged to be 
incapacitation, see Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003), this overlooks how extreme a 
form of incapacitation the state’s penal policies embrace.  Historically incapacitation is 
thought of as the inhibiting effect of penal measures on the personal offending of the subject 
punished.  While imprisonment may be the paradigm form of incapacitation it also long 
included other penal measures that inhibit offending including controls imposed by probation 
sanctions, which can include requirements that the offender avoid contact with potential 
victims, certain occupations, former accomplices, and certain geographical locations.  In its 
strongest form, these orders can be reinforced with electronic monitoring.  Other preventive 
measures include drugs that inhibit drinking, or hormone therapy to reduce sex drive in sex 
offenders.  California’s penality is distinctive in its commitment to incarceration as the only 
credible form of penal incapacitation.  I use the term “total incapacitation,” to capture this 
extreme approach to incapacitation.  This logic relentlessly pushes for longer and more secure 
imprisonment.  In this penal vision an LWOP sentence under supermax prison conditions 
would be the ideal sentence, not just for murder, but for any serious crime. 
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by crime in society.  Appeals to rehabilitation, or retribution understood 
as just deserts, point to factors that can encourage sympathy for the 
offender and acceptance of limits to punishment.  Rehabilitation helps 
define the violence of the offender as, at least in part, due to factors 
beyond his or her control, and promises to utilize the punishment 
experience to address those factors and reform the likely future 
behavior of the offender.  Just deserts presents the offender as an equal 
member of the community who must be called to account for his or her 
usurpation of the victim’s rights, but who can “pay their debt” to society 
through the expiation of just punishment.  In contrast, incapacitation 
calls attention only to the dangerousness of the offender and promises 
only to contain that threat, not redress it. 
Third, the rise of human rights law internationally, and the growing 
significance of international human right treaties like the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Torture Convention, highlight 
dignity as a central positive value that must be protected by the law 
including the law of murder.51 In England, the law of murder today is 
also determined in important respects by European Convention of 
Human Rights.  As enforced by the European Court and promoted by 
European Community administrative organs like the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Degrading Punishment, this new background 
law has been a significant counterweight to the political pressure of 
populist punitiveness, especially in sustaining an institutional 
commitment to resocialization, individualization, progressivity, and 
potential for release within the penal establishments of treaty member 
state.  In the U.S., the emergence of dignity as an influential substantive 
norm for the criminal law only just begun and is likely to move more 
slowly as it is limited to the interpretation of the “cruel and unusual” 
punishment ban under the 8th Amendment and the meaning of 
“degrading and inhumane” punishments under the Torture 
Convention.52 
Fourth, there are signs that some process of revaluation of 
punishment and the law of murder is already beginning.  In England, 
which has experienced a less extreme but similar pattern of escalating 
 
51. As James Whitman has argued, dignity has historically been a much greater 
influence on the development of penal law in Europe than in the United States.  See JAMES 
Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE 
BETWEEN AMERICAN AND EUROPE 7–8 (2003). 
52. But see Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (finding LWOP for a juvenile 
convicted of a non-homicide offense cruel and unusual) and Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct, 1910 
(2011) (describing dignity as a core principle behind the 8th Amendment). 
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punishment in recent decades53 is, after a long period of increasing its 
penal severity and incapacitation orientation of its justice system, in a 
period of reconsidering its heavy reliance on imprisonment—while there 
are political and economic factors that have driven this reconsideration, 
there is also a significant concern with the legitimacy of the penal law in 
a period of mass incarceration.  In particular, the law of murder in 
particular has come under scrutiny.  In 2005, the Law Commission, a 
chartered expert body on law reform, published its consultation paper, 
A New Homicide Act for England and Wales?54  The consultation paper 
specifically cited the harsh minimums for life sentences established by 
the 2003 Criminal Justice Act as requiring an effort to reform and 
rationalize the law of murder.  The Law Commission published its final 
report in 2006 recommending a three-tier structure to the law of 
murder.55  The New Labour government then in power in England and 
Wales, whose policy choices largely lay behind the growth in 
imprisonment, was unwilling to bring the report to Parliament for any 
serious consideration as legislation, instead issuing its own pointedly 
different consultation paper in 2008 and later adopted only a series of 
changes to the affirmative defenses to murder while leaving its basic 
structure the same.56  Yet despite the failure of reforming legislation on 
the structure of murder to emerge thus far, I take the Law Commission’s 
report and the broad discussion engendered by them to be a significant 
indication the growing problem of legitimacy for criminal law and 
particularly the law of murder.  Specifically, the Commission’s call to 
adopt a three tier structure of murder is an invitation for American 
 
53. GARLAND, supra note 25, at 8; Newburn, supra note 26, at 433–35. 
54. MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE, supra note 22, at 2 n.3. 
55. See id. at 15–18.  Thus far there has been no action in Parliament on the paper’s 
recommendations.  However, the Labour government in power in Westminster until May, 
2010, which formed in August of 2007, was successor to the Labour government which 
adopted the harsh features of the 2003 Criminal Justice Act and was unlikely to take any 
steps which would appear to dampen the force of one of New Labour’s signature initiatives.  
The coalition government (of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democratic Party) has 
publicly questioned the wisdom of the mandatory minimums in the 2003 Act.  See generally 
LORD CHANCELLOR AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, BREAKING THE CYCLE: 
EFFECTIVE PUNISHMENT, REHABILITATION AND SENTENCING OF OFFENDERS 2010, Cm. 
7972 (U.K.).  While repealing these minimums might take away some of the pressure to 
reform the overall law of murder, the current government may find the direction taken in the 
consultation paper more to its liking than the last one clearly did. 
56. See Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law 5 
(Ministry of Justice, Consultation Paper No. 19, 2008) (putting off for the future 
consideration of the Law Commission’s recommendations on the structure of the law of 
murder). 
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readers to consider whether we have lost something in the emergence of 
flat and high defacto single degree of murder in states like California. 
In the remainder of this article I will describe in more detail the 
evolution of the law of murder in the England and the United States 
from the penal heat perspective.  Specifically, I will examine four change 
points; the emergence of the murder-manslaughter distinction in the 
17th century; the emergence of degrees of murder at the end of the 19th 
century, the emergence of parole in the 20th century; and the abolition, 
or near abolition in the case of the U.S., of the death penalty in the last 
third of the 20th century.  Next, I consider the present, when in both 
England and at least some jurisdictions in the United States there is a 
collapse of the law of murder toward a higher flatter grading.  In the 
final section, I will offer some tentative propositions toward reform on 
questions considered by the English Law Commission consultation 
paper: How many crimes of murder?  And how should these crimes 
articulate into the structure of punishment? 
II.  EVOLUTION OF MURDER AS PENAL MODERATOR 
A.  The Common Law System: Murder and Manslaughter 
The first great distinction in the law of murder was between murder 
and manslaughter.  At the dawn of the common law, any killing was a 
felony violating the King’s peace and was a capital crime.  Justifications 
like necessity and even self-defense were grounds on which a royal 
pardon was to be expected as an entitlement, but did not occur 
automatically.57  Accident, or “misadventure” in the words of the 
common law, along with infancy and insanity were also strong grounds 
for a royal pardon, but still were not an entitlement.  Those without such 
a justification or excuse could still evade a sentence of death by pleading 
the “benefit of clergy.”  This legal device was originally an expression of 
the jurisdictional separation between church and state.  Clerics charged 
with felonies could not be sentenced by a secular court (at least without 
first being stripped of their clerical immunity by an ecclesiastical court).  
In the 12th century, this rule expanded so that virtually any first time 
felon could claim the “benefit” through demonstrating the ability to 
recite, in Latin, the first lines of Psalm 51.58  The typical punishment of 
one who successfully pled the benefit was branding on the hand,59 and 
 
57. Perkins, supra note 30, at 540. 
58. BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 21. 
59. This practice was designed to detect repeat offenders who were not eligible for the 
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continued confinement in the jail for the balance of a year from the time 
of their arrest.60  Benefit of clergy was available whether the behavior 
and mental state of the defendant approximated what we would today 
call murder or manslaughter. 
The birth of murder as a distinct crime for which the most severe 
penalties were available (even if not necessarily reserved yet) was a 
product of the Tudor period (1485-1603), as legislation withdrew the 
benefit of clergy from those felonious killings associated with “malice 
aforethought” (or malice prepensed).61 
 
From this time on it seem clear that what been the old 
felony of murder was now divided into those offences 
which were ‘willful and of malice aforethought’, not 
clergyable and consequently capital, and those which, 
being neither in self-defence nor a result of 
misadventure, nevertheless bore culpability. . . . The 
effect was to drive a great wedge into the law of 
homicide, splitting off the discrete crime of murder from 
those other killings which were to become known as 
manslaughter.62 
 
By the 17th century, Lord Coke defined murder in express reliance 
on the concept of malice aforethought: 
 
Murder is when a man of sound memory and of the age 
of discretion, unlawfully killeth within any County of the 
Realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura under 
the King’s peace, with malice fore-thought, either 
expressed by the party, or implied by law, so as the party 
wounded or hurt, etc. die of the wound or hurt, etc. 
within a year and a day after the same.63 
  
 
benefit.  Id. 
60. The plea was apparently not always successful even for those who met its formal test.  
Id. 
61. Perkins, supra note 30, at 543–44.  
62. BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 21–22.  
63. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 47 (1669).  
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Modern criminal lawyers have been understandably short tempered 
with this archaic sounding term and have viewed it as providing little 
real guidance to prosecutors, judges, or jurors today.64  Since the end of 
the 19th century, both English and American lawyers have claimed that 
the term is little more than a signifier for whatever mental state is 
required by law to establish the crime of murder.65  But to Coke’s era, 
and well into the modern period, the term borrowed directly from what 
could be presumed to be a widely shared religious sensibility to describe 
those persons whose acts of killing manifested a corrupted soul, an evil 
disposition.  “The concept of sin was predicated upon the notion of a 
wrong act having been freely willed by the sinner, the evil intention 
having been translated into the physical deed.”66 
Instead of the modern search for a mental state underlying this 
concept, the early common law world expected criminality to be 
manifest and visible.  Malice aforethought stood out in a world where 
killing was far from uncommon, because it took forms specifically 
indicating a deliberate purpose to kill a particular individual rather than 
a violent assertion of personal honor invoked by a social interaction.  
Indeed, one original use of the French term murdrum was for killings 
that were done in secret.67  Lord Bracton, often considered the founder 
of the common law conception of murder, defined “malice 
aforethought” as a killing “where one in anger or hatred or for the sake 
of gain, deliberately and in premeditated assault, has killed another 
wickedly and in breach of the king’s peace.”68  But in Coke’s 
formulation, this manifestly deliberately performed killing only 
constituted one form of malice aforethought, “express malice.”  Other 
killings could manifest evil, because they were done with no provocation 
at all, or because the victim was a magistrate or public official (generally 
a higher status person), or because it had been carried out in the course 
of another crime like robbery.  These killings, which Coke described 
bearing “implied malice,” were also murder (and non clergyable), an 
 
64. E.g., Perkins, supra note 30, at 548. 
65. See id. at 567–68. 
66. BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 20. 
67. Id. 
68. 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 34 (George E. Woodbine 
ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., The Belknap Press 1968); Wilson, supra note 28, at 161.  In 
Scotland, Lord Hume described murder as a killing with a wicked intent or wicked 
recklessness, or in the Scots, dole from the Latin dolus.  See DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIME, 21 (B.R. Bell ed., Edinburgh, Law Society 
of Scotland 1986) (1797).  See generally T.H. JONES & M.G.A. CHRISTIE, CRIMINAL LAW 
(4th ed. 2008). 
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approach that survives to this day in many U.S. states that retain the 
common law categories.69 
At this point killing becomes a two-tiered crime.  One crime, malice 
aforethought killing, including deliberate killings, and those where 
malice was implied by the context of the crime, were murder and in 
theory punished by mandatorily by execution (Royal pardon continued 
to be available however).  The other crime, manslaughter, originally 
those killings that were overt and responded to provocative action by 
the victim following the predictable channels of social custom in an 
armed and violent society, were manslaughter, resulting possibly in 
execution, but more typically, at the judge’s discretion, in benefit of 
clergy for first offenders.  With some judicial sculpting along the way, 
this two tiered system of murder and manslaughter, with murder 
presumptively subject to execution and manslaughter presumptively 
limited to a relatively modest of penalty of branding plus a jail sentence 
of less than a year,70 lasted in England until second half of the 20th 
century.  At that time, in an effort to limit the death penalty, Parliament 
passed the Homicide Act of 1957, which defined several categories of 
aggravated murder as capital crimes and subjected the rest to a life 
sentence—in effect, creating degrees of murder.71  The abolition of the 
death penalty for England and Wales in 1965 essentially undid this 
statutory structure, rendering the categories of aggravated murder 
essentially nugatory and making a mandatory life sentence the singular 
punishment for murder. 
From a penal heat perspective, there are several points to note about 
the two tiered murder manslaughter system.  First, it was the opposite of 
flat.  The difference between murder and manslaughter was not just 
between death and life, but between death and a largely symbolic 
punishment (branding on the thumb) with only a minimal amount of jail 
time associated mostly with waiting for the trial.72  Second, while the 
conceptual divide between murder and manslaughter through the notion 
of malice aforethought may confound modern lawyers looking for a 
mental state or states that corresponds to its various express and implied 
forms, in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth century it probably did an 
 
69. BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 26. 
70. Perkins, supra note 30, at 541. 
71. Albeit these degrees were quite different in their mens rea requirements than those 
in the degrees in most U.S. states. 
72. This would change in the 19th century when transportation and later prison 
sentences became the punishment for manslaughter. 
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excellent job mapping on to widely shared religious and social 
conventions.  The idea that those whose killing indicated a deeper kind 
of sin should be punished far more severely than those whose killing 
resulted from a lapse in virtue had purchase in a deeply religious and 
very violent society.  Likewise, the separation between killings that 
occurred in the content of an open clash among armed men, and others 
precipitated by stealth, or crime, captured significant features of the 
sociology of killing in the early modern world. 
On closer inspection, however, the system concentrated power at the 
center in ways that must have limited its capacity to channel penal heat 
away from the political center.  English judges tightly controlled when a 
manslaughter instruction was given.73  Only in some cases could juries 
choose between death and symbolic punishment.  More importantly, the 
political executive left even these controlled choices subject to its own 
power of revision (at least for those convicted of murder).  Instead, 
while death was the mandatory punishment for murder, far fewer than 
half of all those so sentenced actually died at the gallows.  Moreover, 
death was also a possible punishment for manslaughter; so the 
substantive law did little work in separating the doomed from the 
returnable.  Most received a Royal pardon permitting them to return to 
society after some months of languishing under the threat of death (and 
later after a period transportation or imprisonment).74  Historians 
disagree over what logics governed pardons, whether a subtle and 
precise instrument of class governance in an increasingly unequal and 
unstable society, or as a way of reflecting the complex moral view of 
violence beyond the crude outlines of murder law; but in either, case 
select they did, and without the burden of public justification.  By 
retaining and frequently using the power to pardon, the executive kept 
the penal heat of violent crime and execution close to its own quarters. 
This may have been a worthwhile tradeoff for the political value that 
pardon gave the sovereign to adjust the level of mercy or terror required 
by a particular political moment.75  No doubt the nature of monarchy, 
without the problem of being accountable to elections, made it far easier 
for the system to withstand penal heat, and in a sense, may have 
 
73. JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 332 (5th 
ed. 2004).  
74. After 1837, the royal prerogative of mercy, as it was formally know, was exercised by 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department acting at the sovereign’s behalf but under 
the political control of the government.  See BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 112. 
75. For an account that stresses these political calculations, see FOUCAULT, supra note 
10, at 48–50.  
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required its energy and emotional force to sustain its majesty.76  It does 
appear that this became more of a problem in the 19th century as law 
enforcement and prosecution both improved, creating an ever larger 
number of candidates for the gallows and widening the gap between 
those threatened with execution and those actually receiving execution.77  
We can observe series of moves in the 19th century that seem designed 
to lessen the penal heat produced by these actions.  The spectrum of 
crimes subject to capital punishment, which remained very broad up 
through the 1820s, was essentially narrowed to murder in 1831.78  In 
1860, public executions completely disappeared, and the gallows were 
moved inside prisons and deprived of their audience.79  Also in the 
1860s, Parliament, for the first time, gave serious consideration to 
creating degrees of murder such as those introduced in the United 
States at the end of the previous century (and which we address further 
in the next section) in which only first-degree murders would be subject 
to capital punishment.80  While the move did not carry, it suggests not 
only a perceived need to reduce the number of executions (and 
pardons), but also the need to give juries more authority and thus 
reduce the penal heat channeled to the center. 
B.  Degrees of Murder 
The colony of Pennsylvania began to modify the common law of 
murder under Governor William Penn between 1682 and 1683.81  
Repudiating the language of “malice aforethought” and seeking to 
reduce the use of capital punishment, Penn’s legislation abolished the 
death penalty for all crimes except murder, which it defined as “willfully 
or premeditatedly kill another person.”82  The innovation was soon 
reversed as the colony sought to win approval from the English crown 
for reforms of court procedure designed to allow Quakers to serve as 
judges.83  The push for limiting the death penalty, however, returned 
with the first state constitution in Pennsylvania following the 
Declaration of Independence in 1776.84  In 1792, after considerable 
 
76. See FOUCAULT, supra note 10, at 48–50.   
77. See GATRELL, supra note 8, at 19–20.  
78. See id. at 22–23.  
79. Id. at 10.  
80. BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 60. 
81. Keedy, supra note 11, at 760.  
82. Id. at 761.  
83. Id. at 761–63.  
84. Id. at 766–67.  
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advocacy for limiting the death penalty by leading citizens and jurists, 
the Governor proposed limiting the death penalty to “High Treason and 
Murder.”85  Finally, in 1794 the state assembly approved the following 
language: 
Whereas the design of punishment is to prevent the 
commission of crimes, and to repair the injury that hath 
been done thereby to society or the individual, and it 
hath been found by experience, that these objects are 
better obtained by moderate but certain penalties, than 
by severe and excessive punishments: And whereas it is 
the duty of every government to endeavor to reform, 
rather than exterminate offenders, and the punishment 
of death ought never to be inflicted, where it is not 
absolutely necessary to public safety: Therefore, 
Sect. I. Be it enacted by the SENATE and the HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES of the commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met, and it is hereby 
enacted by authority of the same, That no crime 
whatsoever, hereafter committed (except murder of the 
first-degree) shall be punished with death in the state of 
Pennsylvania. 
Sect. II. And whereas the several offences, which are 
included under the general denomination of murder, 
differ so greatly from each other in the degree of their 
atrociousness that it is unjust to involve them in the same 
punishment: Be it further enacted by the Authority 
aforesaid, That all murder, which shall be perpetrated by 
means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind 
of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which 
shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to 
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be 
deemed murder of the first-degree; and all other kinds of 
murder shall be deemed murder in the second-degree; 
and the jury, before whom any person indicted for 
murder shall be tried, shall, if they find the person guilty 
thereof, ascertain in their verdict, whether it be murder 
of the first or second-degree.86 
 
  
 
85. Id. at 770. 
86. Id. at 772–73 (citing 4 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 242 (Pa. 1794)). 
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Pennsylvania had split the old English crime of “malice 
aforethought” murder, creating for the first time in the common law 
world a three-tier structure for murder. “First-degree” murder was “all 
murder perpetrated by poison or lying in wait or by any kind of willful, 
premeditated and deliberate killing,” plus what would come to be 
known as “felony murder.”87  Manslaughter would remain what is was 
for English common law, a killing that would otherwise be murder, 
which took place under circumstances that were considered sufficiently 
provocative by the judge to warrant an instruction.88   Second-degree 
murder was the residual category, an intentional killing that was not 
“willful, premeditated and deliberate,” or a killing that did not occur 
during one of the listed felonies.89  By the end of the 19th century, most 
U.S. states had adopted some version of the two degrees of murder 
(with slight variations in the specific terms used to define first-degree 
murder).90 
This new structure of murder was tightly linked to the grading of 
punishment.  Death was limited to first-degree murder.  This division of 
malice aforethought murder limited the most severe penalty of death to 
the first-degree murder.  By the middle of the 19th century, Tennessee 
granted the jury, which already had the power to select between first 
and second-degree murder, the additional power to sentence even a 
first-degree murderer to life imprisonment.91  Unlike the old benefit of 
clergy however, American states with their new penitentiaries offered 
long sentences of imprisonment and hard labor for both second-degree 
murder and manslaughter, with a substantial separation. 
The key terms of “premeditated” and “deliberate,” along with the 
illustrative categories of “murder perpetrated by poison or lying in 
wait,” seemed designed to reinforce what malice aforethought had 
suggested—killing that proved the killer’s evil character by manifesting 
 
87. The original proposal voted in Pennsylvania senate in 1793 would have been limited 
to the “willful, premeditated and deliberate killing” but the felony murder rule was inserted 
during while the measure was being debated in the assembly.  Id. at 772.  
88. American courts would expand the categories of such provocation more rapidly than 
their English counterparts.  See Victoria Nourse, Passions Progress: Modern Law Reform and 
the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1340–41 (1997) (describing the move in modern 
U.S. law toward more subjective definitions of adequate provocation and away from the strict 
categorical approach of the common law). 
89. Frederick W. Danforth, Jr., The Model Penal Code and Degrees of Criminal 
Homicide, 11 AM. U. L. REV. 147, 149 (1962).  
90. Matthew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 146 
(1999). 
91. Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 375 n. 4 (1994). 
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settled determination to kill.  By the end of its first century, however, 
the concept of a clear subset of manifestly evil killings was breaking 
down.  Prosecutors began to seek—and win—first-degree murder 
convictions where evidence of such a well-settled determination to kill 
was circumstantial and where the facts of the killing were not 
inconsistent with a sudden argument.  Simultaneously, state supreme 
courts held that “willful, premeditated, and deliberate,” meant little 
more than intentional.92  Indeed, standard judicial instructions of the 
20th century cited in horn books was that no time was too short for the 
evil mind to determine on itself to kill and to formulate a plan to carry 
that out.93 
From the penal heat perspective we can see the adoption of degrees 
of murder in its revolutionary context of the late 18th century as a 
repudiation of both the high level of execution, which made England 
stand out, even in the European context,94 and the extensive use of royal 
pardons, which must have been inherently distasteful to the 
revolutionary generation, even when exercised by elected rather than 
monarchical sovereigns.  Discretion remained rampant, but now it 
belonged to more popular bodies, including the prosecutor (almost 
always a locally elected executive) and, of course, the jury.  The English 
two tiered system kept the jury under tight control by the judge who had 
to decide whether or not to instruct them on manslaughter (if he did not, 
the jury could only decide between hanging and acquitting).  Thus to a 
far greater degree, the American three tier approach channeled the 
penal heat of murder away from the center of political authority and 
toward popular decision makers.  Of course, they had little insulation 
against this heat, a factor that may have helped push marginal cases 
toward first-degree murder; but that was the point, they could be 
responsive to public opinion, and when they were not, backlashes were 
likely to come quickly (prosecutors having to face election as well as the 
street level pressure that jurors must have felt).  There was very little 
effort to rationalize the substantive law of murder as a sorting 
mechanism. 
Compared to the English two-tiered model, the American system 
offered a more gradual slope of severity.  Under the benefit of clergy 
system, those killings found to lack malice aforethought might well be 
 
92. Keedy, supra note 11, at 773; Danforth, supra note 89, at 150. 
93. Id. at 151. 
94. An 18th century political cartoon satirizes the phrase “Merry England” with a 
depiction of a crow or raven alighted on top of a gallows.  GATRELL, supra note 8, at 192. 
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punished only symbolically.  If the point of tiers is to open up space 
within punishment for morally and culturally satisfying distinctions 
among killings, that model was hard to exceed.  However, it may well 
have been too wide.  Hesitation to allow a killer to walk free (with 
essentially promise to be executed next time) may have made judges 
reluctant to give the manslaughter instruction and made jurors reluctant 
to choose it.  Second-degree murder led to the potential for spending 
long terms in prison, providing a form of incapacitation (and 
deterrence) unavailable to the two crime English system.95 
The Pennsylvania version of the three-tiered model also expanded 
the narrative structure of the law of murder.  Prosecutors had two 
theories with which they might prove first-degree murder, “willful, 
premeditated and deliberate,” or that the killing occurred during a 
serious felony.  The famous preface to the Pennsylvania statute adopting 
degrees of murder gives primary emphasis to the reduction of the death 
penalty (and the promotion of utilitarian purposes to the criminal law), 
but the first sentences of the second section suggested a concern with 
the narrative coherence of murder that may, at a distance, be an 
acknowledgement of penal heat as a problem. “[Whereas the several 
offences, which are included under the general denomination of murder, 
differ so greatly from each other in the degree of their atrociousness that 
it is unjust to involve them in the same punishment.”96  While the 
“willful, premeditated, and deliberate” formula may have become 
quickly attenuated as a matter of appellate court doctrine, it remained 
an arc of narrative that the prosecutor had to present and that defense 
had an opportunity to counter narrate.  In contrast, unless the English 
murder defendant received a manslaughter instruction they could only 
offer justification defenses (like self defense), excuse defenses like 
insanity, or attempt an alibi defense.  The American defendant had all 
of these, plus a fall back that even if none of these were strong enough 
to establish the full defense, they could perhaps negate the “willful, 
premeditated and deliberate” element. 
  
 
95. Proposals to add degrees of murder to the English system were made periodically 
after the middle of the 19th century including in 1866, 1948, and 1957.  H.L.A. Hart, Murder 
and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 NW. L. REV. 433, 437 
(1958). 
96. Keedy, supra note 11, at 772.  
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C. 20th Century Reform: Abolition and Parole 
The two great developments shaping reform of the law of murder 
during the 20th century in both England and the U.S. were the growing 
pressures to abolish the death penalty and the adoption of parole as an 
administrative release mechanism.  Parole enabled life sentenced 
murderers to obtain release through a more routine and less politically 
volatile mechanism than seeking clemency or a pardon from the 
Governor had provided.  Parole release was widely adopted in the U.S. 
in the early years of the 20th century.97  Parole can be seen as extending 
the penal heat regulating function of the law of murder in two respects.  
First, parole was able to create an even finely graded system of 
punishment by individualizing the length of prison sentences to 
incorporate not only features of the crime but the character of the 
offender and his post-conviction conduct in prison.  Second, parole 
could channel responsibility for determining the ultimate extent of 
punishment to an administrative process separated both institutionally 
and temporally.98  Parole can also be seen as taking much of the pressure 
off of the legal system to maintain the cultural salience of the 
substantive law of murder.  This release of pressure results because the 
considerations that drive the parole process extend well beyond the 
conduct of the crime and the intentions of the offender and because 
criteria are not typically express. 
The abolition of the death penalty, a process experienced in both 
societies since World War II (although incompletely in the US), can be 
seen from the penal heat perspective as creating a problem.  Historically 
limiting the death penalty to narrower categories of murder has been a 
way to diminish and channel penal heat.  Today however it may be the 
absence of the death penalty that contributes to the building up of 
political pressure to extend the length of life imprisonment and reduce 
the role of administrative release, each to the detriment of the ladder 
principle of punishment. 
  
 
97. For the U.S., see JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL 
CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990, at 33 (1993).  For England, see generally DAVID 
GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PENAL STRATEGIES 
(1985). 
98. Thus, the amount of time a person convicted of murder spends in prison will depend 
on the choices of the jury as well as the decision of a parole board sitting years after the crime 
and the trial. 
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The major reform efforts of the law of murder during the 20th 
century presupposed both the role of administrative release and the 
pressure to reduce if not abolish the death penalty.  Yet today, the quite 
unanticipated interaction of them has undermined the historic effort to 
differentiate among unlawful killings leading to a flattening of the 
punishment of murder toward an unacceptably severe life sentence. 
1.  Parole 
At the start of the 19th century, a murderer spared the death penalty 
by the Pennsylvania statute, or one of its many offspring, would have 
faced either life or a very long determinant sentence in one of the 
penitentiary prisons built in most Northern and Midwestern states (as 
well as many Southern and Western ones) in the first half of that 
century.  Whether spared by the jury’s sentencing decision for life, or by 
being convicted of second-degree murder for which capital punishment 
was not an option, the prisoner would have anticipated the real prospect 
of dying in prison unless a campaign by friends and relatives (supported 
perhaps by prison officials) led to an eventual successful petition for 
clemency.  For governors, this process was inherently fraught and 
generated equal and opposite pressures from victims’ families, local law 
enforcement, and other members of the community.99 
The adoption of parole as a release program began in the last decade 
of the 19th and first decades of the 20th centuries.100  Often murderers 
were excluded from the initial parole laws but were generally included 
in due course.101  Parole changed the condition of murderers (and other 
life sentenced felons) in two important respects.  It gave them a far more 
routinized and promising vehicle of winning release, and it went a long 
way to normalizing their position vis other prisoners.  For example, by 
the post-World War II era in California and in many other states that 
adopted a full-scale version of indeterminate sentencing, not only 
murderers and other “capital” felons but virtually all felons faced a 
theoretical life term. 
  
 
99. Sheldon L. Messinger, et al., The Foundations of Parole in California, 19 LAW & 
SOC. REV. 69, 100 (1985).  
100. See generally GARLAND, supra note 97; SIMON, supra note 97.  
101. The original 1893 parole law excluded murderers and other prisoners serving life 
sentences, but in 1901 the law was extended to murderers and other life prisoners who had 
served at least seven years.  By the end of the first decade of parole, nearly 10 % (or ten 
percent) of the prisoners who had been granted parole were murderers.  Messinger et al., 
supra note 9, at 90.  
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From a penal heat perspective, parole also went a long way toward 
channeling the ongoing contention about particular cases away from 
politically accountable governors.102  The pardon process had taken the 
decision right to the political center.  Parole in contrast was separated 
from the political chief executive by an administrative board.  Parole 
boards were insulated both by their appointment (rather than election) 
and by the concept that they were making penological judgments based 
on expert knowledge and detailed information about the prison records 
of individuals not generally available to the public.  As rehabilitation 
became the dominant penal rationale of imprisonment, the release 
decision would be justified not on the facts of the crime but on whether 
the release posed a risk to public safety and the parallel question of 
whether rehabilitative programming had achieved its goals and 
transformed the criminal deviance of the prisoner that led to his (or 
more rarely, her) crime. 
An example of how this system could work during the 20th century 
was Nathan Leopold, who along with his friend Richard Loeb 
kidnapped and murdered a little boy from their own neighborhood, in a 
version of “thrill murder” that became one of the 20th centuries several 
“crimes of the century.”103  Charged with first-degree murder, the two 
defendants, not yet twenty, faced a high likelihood of being sentenced to 
death by the jury given the enormity of the crime (murder plus kidnap 
for ransom of a child) and the considerable sensationalistic and 
prejudicial press coverage of both the crime and the defendants.  
Famously Clarence Darrow took on their defense in which the two pled 
guilty and put on a sentencing defense to a judge.104  Based on one of the 
most extensive forensic case studies of the medical and psychological 
condition of the defendants ever assembled at that time, Darrow 
persuaded Judge John R. Caverly to spare them hanging.  The 
punishment however must have sounded quite was severe.  In a phrase 
he would use as the title of his autobiography, Nathan Leopold (and 
 
102. Murderers continued to be a worry for governors in the early days of parole in 
California.  Id. at 91.  
103. On the Loeb and Leopold murder, see generally Paula S. Fass, Making and 
Remaking an Event: The Leopold and Loeb Case in American Culture, 80 J. AM. HIST. 919 
(1993); Jonathan Simon, “A Situation So Unique That it Will Probably Never Repeat Itself”: 
Madness, Youth, and Homicide in Twentieth Century Criminal Jurisprudence, in LAW’S 
MADNESS 79 (Austin Sarat ed., 2003).  
104. On Darrow’s defense of Loeb and Leopold, see Scott Howe, Reassessing the 
Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing: Darrow’s Defense of Loeb and Leopold, 79 
IOWA L. REV. 989, 990–91 (1994). 
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Loeb) were each sentenced to “life plus 99 years” in the Illinois 
penitentiary.  For Loeb it would be a life sentence, and a relatively short 
one, he died in a murderous attack by another inmate a decade into his 
incarceration.105  Leopold became the poster child for rehabilitation, 
using his formidable education and intellect to teach other prisoners, 
participate in medical experiments and publish his own criminological 
findings on recidivism before being paroled in 1958 after 33 years of 
imprisonment.106 
Parole figured explicitly in the decision of Herbert Wechsler to 
propose an abandonment of degrees of murder in the influential Model 
Penal Code.107  In place of degrees of murder, Wechsler and the MPC 
offered a single crime of murder with three possible mental state 
elements (purpose, knowledge and extreme recklessness).108  While 
eliminating degrees of murder, the MPC retained the distinction 
between murder and manslaughter, making the level of cognitive 
awareness of the risk of death, and the reasons for taking the risk, as 
well as the presence of extreme emotional disturbance (a variation on 
the provocation theme of common law), the major criteria.109  The 
Code’s sentencing system allowed judges to establish the minimum 
amount of imprisonment along a ladder principle with higher possible 
minima for murder than manslaughter.  Murder was a felony of the 
“first-degree” which meant a maximum of life imprisonment (although 
for murder, death was also a possibility governed by a different process), 
with judges free to set a minimum of up to ten years.110  On the other 
hand, manslaughter was a felony of the second-degree with a potential 
maximum prison sentence of ten years, permitting a judge to set a 
minimum of up to three years.111  Between the minimum and the 
maximum, parole authorities could determine the timing of release.112  In 
 
105. Loeb was blamed for provoking his own killing by making a sexual proposition or 
assault on his killer.  Historians think it more likely he was the victim of predatory sexual 
violence and extortion.  See generally HAL HIGDON, THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY—THE 
LEOPOLD AND LOEB CASE (1999).  
106. See id. at 312, 315, 321.  Both were prodigies, the youngest graduates at that time 
ever of the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan respectively.  Id. at 16–17. 
107. Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Murder, the Model Code, and the Multiple 
Agendas of Reform, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 773, 780 (1988). 
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1980).  
109. Id. § 210.3.  
110. Id.  
111. Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. 
REV. 465, 475 (1961). 
112. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 107, at 780. 
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the context of the mid-20th century, this process was a compromise 
between the traditional commitment to a ladder principle of punishment 
graded to the nature of the offense, and the modern correctionalist ideal 
of complete flexibility tied to rehabilitative considerations.113 
Wechsler argued that this mixed system of grading punishment 
permitting both offense based considerations and individualizing 
considerations was a way of optimizing the epistemological advantages 
of both court and parole system. 
 
The point on which the court can make the best and 
most decisive judgment at the time of sentence is [that] 
which calls for an appraisal of the impact of the 
disposition on the general community, whose values and 
security have been disturbed. . . .   
[The court should, therefore,] be empowered to 
prescribe a minimum duration of the term. . . .   
[T]he court is poorly equipped at the time of 
sentence to make solid and decisive judgments on the 
period required for the process of correction to realize its 
optimum potentiality or for the risk of further criminality 
to reach a level where the release of the offender appears 
reasonably safe.  The organs of correction . . . [e.g., 
parole boards] are best equipped to make decisions of 
this order and to make them later on in time, in light of 
observation and experience within the institution.114 
 
The capital sentencing function of degrees of murder would be 
refined by the MPC’s guided discretion system to consider many more 
factors, both aggravating and mitigating, than those involved in the 
premeditated and deliberate or felony murder bases for first-degree 
murder.  These will be discussed below, but it is important to note that 
the abandonment of degrees of murder and its replacement by a multi-
factor, guided discretion approach to capital sentencing, shares an 
essential premise with the parole system.  Both move away from 
doctrinally structured grading of punishment toward the individual 
characteristics of the offender.  Both also prioritize incapacitation, 
reformability, and to some extent deterrence or reflection of public 
concern as primary considerations rather than retribution.115 
 
113. Id. (citing PAUL TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 431 (1960)).  
114. Wechsler, supra note 111, at 476.  
115. On Wechsler’s commitment to individualization and the priority of incapacitation 
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Entering the last quarter of the 20th century, most states retained the 
common law degrees of murder, but they also allowed parole release, 
and administrative processes that permitted other mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances of the crime or the prisoner to be taken into 
account in determining the actual length of time in prison under a 
nominal life sentence.  California, for instance, retained the degrees of 
murder but between the 1940s and the 1980s, the California Supreme 
Court revisited the elements of first degree murder repeatedly in an 
effort to restore more doctrinal coherence to the meaning of 
premeditation and deliberation, to reduce the scope of the felony 
murder rule, and to expand the cases in which individual features of the 
defendant could be considered in mitigating what would otherwise be 
murder to manslaughter.116  The California court argued that the 
distinction between murder and manslaughter and the degrees of 
murder represented efforts at individualizing the law. 
 
Dividing intentional homicides into murder and 
voluntary manslaughter was a recognition of the 
infirmity of human nature.  Again dividing the offense of 
murder into two degrees is a further recognition of that 
infirmity and of difference in the quantum of personal 
turpitude of the offenders.  The difference is basically in 
the offenders but is to be measured by the character of 
the particular homicide.117 
 
Since California had adopted a broad indeterminate sentence law in 
1944, the operation of the system would have functioned much like that 
recommended by the Model Penal Code but with even more flexibility.  
Some grading would occur at the point of conviction for one of the 
degrees of murder, or manslaughter, but this would have established 
only a minimum sentence (seven years for first-degree murder, three 
years for second-degree murder, and no minimum for manslaughter), 
while the indeterminate sentence meant the maximum for each was life 
in prison with the release decision in the hands of the administrative 
parole board. 
 
and reform as against retribution, see Russell Dean Covey, Exorcising Wechsler’s Ghost: The 
Influence of the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HAST. 
CONST. L.Q. 189, 193–95 (2004).  
116. Suzanne Mounts, Premeditation and Deliberation in California: Returning to a 
Distinction without a Difference, 36 U.S.F. L. REV 261, 289–305 (2002). 
117. People v. Holt, 153 P.2d 21, 37 (Cal. 1944). 
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 At its height, in the years following World War II, parole appended 
to the system of degrees of murder was a formidable “radiator” of penal 
heat.  Confronted with a killer, the system had a wide range of choices 
to reaffirm social priorities.  They could charge him with first-degree 
murder and seek to execute those killers whose crime and or character 
inspired the greatest public outrage, or accept a guilty plea to second-
degree murder.  Those killers whose motivations won public sympathy 
could obtain mitigation to manslaughter and the promise of an 
especially early opportunity for release.  These aspects were highly 
tuned to local sentiment through the jury and through the locally elected 
public prosecutor.  At the same time, parole meant that the jury’s 
decision could be effectively neutralized after the fact, with a person 
convicted of manslaughter being held long after their parole eligibility 
date while, second or even first-degree murderers might be released at 
the first opportunity if the board was so inclined. 
This radiator allowed killing to be separated into a set of legally 
distinct categories in ways that corresponded to broadly recognized 
social types if not a satisfying analytic or morally coherent system.  
Those who might generate the most “heat” could be sentenced to death 
and actually executed in little more than a year from the time of 
conviction.  Other cases could “age” in the penitentiary, under the 
apparent awful burden of life sentence, but with the promise of parole in 
the not too distant future if they played their cards right.  The victim’s 
family and media might never even learn of the parole,118 and even if 
they did, it was virtually certain that the public heat about the crime 
would have dissipated considerably.  Indeed, the media would most 
likely catch wind of it only if the parolee had been arrested for a new 
and serious crime. 
2.  Abolition 
The second great movement shaping reform of the structure of 
murder in the 20th century was the post-war movement to abolish the 
death penalty.  Parole and its positive story of rehabilitation helped to 
provide part of the narrative for completing the abolition of the death 
penalty by removing it from the last “normal” crime where it remained 
as a regular penal option, murder.  The presumed capacity of prisons to 
rehabilitate serious criminals and incapacitate those who posed an 
 
118. Contemporary laws give victims far more rights to notice and participation in the 
process, but this was a development of the late 20th century, one that has gone a long way 
toward removing the heat dissipating value of parole. 
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ongoing threat suggested that execution was no longer necessary as a 
means of public safety and at the very least warranted limiting the death 
penalty to some rational consideration of who should die, rather than 
either the mandatory death penalty of England (mitigated by pardons) 
or the jury lottery of first-degree murder in the United States (which 
Darrow had famously avoided with his guilty plea for Loeb and 
Leopold).119  Perhaps of even greater importance were the industrial 
scale uses of state killing of non-combatants by the Germans in World 
War II.  Following the war, after a brief period in which capital 
punishment was widely used by the victorious countries to execute Nazi 
leaders and many of their collaborators, the international movement to 
abolish the death penalty for ordinary crimes was revitalized.  While 
first generation of Human Rights charters signed after the war accepted 
the death penalty,120 by the 1950s abolition was being embraced by many 
European countries (beginning with the defeated Axis powers).121  In 
England, considerable interest in Parliament in abolishing capital 
punishment produced an initial compromise of legislation that was, in its 
own right, the most substantial intervention by Parliament in the law of 
murder in history—the Homicide Act of 1957.  The Act ended the 
mandatory penalty of death for murder and limited capital punishment 
to defined set of aggravated murders, mostly based on threats to public 
order and the operation of the justice system itself (but including 
theft).122 
 
119. During the Parliamentary debate on the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) 
Act of 1965, the Lord Chancellor assured the House that “[W]here there is any possibility of a 
danger to society, my Right Honourable and Learned Friend, the Home Secretary [who held 
parole like powers over prisoners on a life sentence] does not, and will not release a murderer 
from prison, even if that means detaining him for a very long period indeed; if necessary for 
life.”  BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 116. 
120. For example, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 
acknowledged the acceptability of the death penalty.  So long as certain conditions were met, 
“the sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with 
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions 
of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide.  This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment 
rendered by a competent court.”  International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights art. 6, 
cl. 2, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174–75. 
121. FRANKLIN ZIMRING, CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 19 
(2003).  
122. The set of aggravated murders was as follows: (a) any murder done in the course or 
furtherance of theft; (b) any murder by shooting or by causing an explosion; (c) any murder 
done in the course or for the purpose of resisting or avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or 
of effecting or assisting an escape or rescue from legal custody; (d) any murder of a police 
officer acting in the execution of his duty or of a person assisting a police officer so acting; (e) 
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In addition, those convicted of more than one murder, or who had 
been previously convicted of murder were also subjected to the 
mandatory death penalty.123  All other murders were punishable by a life 
sentence.  Thus, seeking to limit the death penalty, the Homicide Act 
had created a new tier of aggravated murder. For the first time England 
had a three tier structure of murder. 
Less than a decade later the Murder (Abolition of the Death 
Penalty) Act of 1965 abolished the death penalty for murder and made 
life imprisonment the mandatory penalty for the crime of murder, 
rendering the aggravated murder provisions irrelevant.  The Homicide 
Act of 1957 remained important for eliminating murder based on a 
felony murder theory (Section 2) and for creating a statutory 
manslaughter doctrine for both provocation (Section 3) and diminished 
responsibility (Section 4).  Parliament also showed considerable support 
for narrowing the mens rea for murder, which included killing with the 
intent to do serious bodily injury, to include only those who intended to 
kill or at least recognized the great likelihood that they would kill and 
chose to carry on.124 
In the United States, the influential Model Penal Code,125 set out a 
reform of the law of murder that included many of the same aspirations 
for reform that animated the English Homicide Act.126  As noted above, 
the central reform of the MPC was eliminating degrees of murder in 
favor of single murder crime with multiple mental states.  The MPC 
included (reluctantly) a capital sentencing approach to replace the first-
degree murder trial that sought to narrow and channel the discretion to 
sentence to death through a set of aggravated murder elements similar 
to those in the Homicide Act. 127 
 
in the case of a person who was a prisoner at the time when he did or was a party to the 
murder, any murder of a prison officer acting in the execution of his duty or of a person 
assisting a prison officer so acting. Homicide Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2,  c.11, § 5(1) (1957) (Eng.).   
123. Id. §§ (6)(1)–(2).   
124. Famously, Parliament was assured by then sitting Chancellor of the High court that 
courts always instructed the juries in intent to injure cases that they should not find guilt 
unless they were convinced the defendant was aware of the risk of death.  However, within 
months of its adoption, the High Court affirmed a murder under circumstances that were 
incompatible with the promise.  See MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE, supra 
note 22, at 8. 
125. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1980).  
126. Both were in fact political compromises.  On Wechsler and the MPC, see generally 
Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 107. 
127. The MPC’s list of capital aggravators includes most of the same ones as the 
Homicide Act:  
 
13. SIMON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2011  8:21 PM 
1276 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [94:1241 
After the Supreme Court struck down all existing capital murder 
statutes in the 1972,128 the Model Penal Code became the template for 
two of the most common features of the new statutes that eventually 
won approval.129  One feature was a bifurcation of the trial into a guilt 
and, if convicted of a capital murder, a separate sentencing hearing. The 
 
(a) The murder was committed by a convict under sentence of 
imprisonment.   
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.   
(c) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed 
another murder.   
(d) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many 
persons.   
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was 
an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight 
after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual 
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.   
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.   
(g) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.   
(h) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity.   
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.6(3).  The MPC also provided a list of mitigating factors 
designed to individualize the extenuating circumstances for each defendant and further 
recommended that the death penalty not be imposed, even when an aggravating factor was 
present, if there was “substantial mitigation”, leaving the decision maker, judge or jury, 
freedom to spare life even in a very aggravated case if defense introduced sufficient 
mitigation: 
 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.  
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or 
consented to the homicidal act.  
(d) The murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant 
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.  
(e) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another 
person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.  
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another 
person.  
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or 
defect or intoxication.  
(h) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.   
Id. § 210.6(4). 
128. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243 (1972).  
129. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976).  
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second feature was a narrowing based largely on aggravating factors, 
including a list of specific types of murders, which followed a conviction 
for a capital form of murder, intended to narrow the field of those 
exposed to the jury’s discretion to sentence to death.130 
Thus in both cases, the initial efforts to restrict the death penalty 
within the categories of  murder generated new structures of the law of 
murder which might have been expected to increase its capacity to 
manage and dissipate the penal heat of murder.  However in both cases 
subsequent developments would nullify this prospect and produce quite 
the opposite.  In England the abolition of the death penalty returned the 
law of murder to a two tiered structure with a mandatory life sentence.  
In the United States, the retrofitting of a law of aggravating factors onto 
the degrees of murder created a four tiered structure of murder.  
However, the appellate process also mandated by the Supreme Court’s 
near abolition of capital punishment in the 1970s has ultimately resulted 
in a much reduced usage of the death penalty.  While death sentences 
initially grew rapidly compared to the period before 1972 the actual 
number of executions has remained very small (peaking at about 100 
executions in 1999) and even in the most aggressive death penalty states 
the portion of murderers subjected to death sentences is a tiny fraction 
of the pre-World War II norm.131 
3.  Summary 
At the end of the 20th century, both in England and the U.S., the law 
of murder looked superficially much like it had at the beginning but with 
fundamental changes in the distribution of punishment.  In England, two 
levels of intentional killing crime were recognized, murder and 
manslaughter.  The mid-century effort to add an aggravated murder tier 
(a three level structure) was short lived.  The most significant change 
was the abolition of capital punishment.  In its place, a mandatory 
sentence of life was amenable to considerable individualization both by 
the judge, who had discretion until 2003 to set the minimum sentence 
before parole could be granted, and consideration by a parole process 
run by correctional professionals under the ultimate control of the 
Home Office (a government ministry).  With the elimination of the 
 
130. On the belated embrace of the MPC aggravating and mitigating factors see, 
Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 107, at 790.  On the subsequent development of aggravating 
factors, see Givelber, supra note 91.  See also Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens 
of Our Esteem: Aggravating Factors in an Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE 
KILLING STATE 81, 81 (Austin Sarat ed.,1998). 
131. ZIMRING, supra note 121, at 7. 
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death penalty in 1965, the combination of judicial discretion over 
minimums and parole allowed for a pretty effective channeling of penal 
heat.  The judge could reflect the public concern aroused by the case 
(factors that we might think about primarily as deterrence or retributive 
concerns) in setting the minimum term of the life sentence, while still 
allowing correctional professionals and their concerns (both 
rehabilitation and penal prudence about managing people in prison) to 
govern the ultimate release of the prisoner to the community.  So things 
would stand until the politicization of murder in the 1990s. 
In the United States, capital punishment remains a sentencing option 
for first-degree murder where the elements defined by aggravating 
factors can be established.  In principle this means there are in four tiers 
of murder crimes ranging from first-degree murder with aggravating 
factors (or special circumstances as some states denominate them) 
through first-degree murder, second-degree murder and manslaughter.  
In principle, the U.S. system, at least in those states that retained capital 
punishment, the four tier structure should have been even more 
effective in channeling the penal heat of murders.  The death penalty 
remains available for the murders that most outrage or scare the public.  
Other killers can be incapacitated in prison for periods that follow the 
ladder principle in aligning sentences to the grading of the crimes (even 
if modified in part by parole).  In fact, while the death penalty remains 
the law in 35 states and in the federal government and while executions 
still occur, the system is far better at producing litigation than it is at 
executing prisoners.132  The result is a system that, rather than dissipating 
heat by eliminating those the public is encouraged to fear the most, 
actually produces heat by defining condemned prisoners as the “worst of 
the worst” who pose an ongoing threat to public safety even while in 
prison, but subjecting victims and the public to decades of delay and 
litigation. 133 
 
132. There remain many people sentenced to death, but the gap between sentences and 
executions has only grown over time, leading to large death rows and the prospects of 
prisoners serving life sentences in death row conditions.  More recently there has been a drop 
off in both death sentences sought and in the number imposed by juries.  This is thought to 
reflect growing public anxiety about wrongful convictions stirred by actual exonerations of 
some death row inmates, as well as the substantial decline in murders since the early 1990s.  
See THE DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2010: YEAR 
END REPORT 1, 3 (2010), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2010Year 
End-Final.pdf (noting death sentences in 2010 were the lowest in 34 years and 64% lower 
than in 1996.) 
133. The average time between sentencing and execution for those executed in 2009 was 
14 years.  Id. at 3. 
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In both England and the United States, parole remains a release 
mechanism for many convicted of murder, but the interaction of the 
limitation of the death penalty in the U.S., and its abolition in England, 
has undermined parole.  In the U.S., this is most obvious in the rapid 
growth of Life Without Parole (LWOP) sentences for murder.  Virtually 
unknown in the middle of the 20th century LWOP has become the most 
typical alternative to the death penalty in retention states, and the 
mandatory punishment for the most serious grade of murders in those 
states that have eliminated the death penalty.  Indeed, advocates of 
abolition have lobbied for LWOP in order to give juries more reason to 
not impose the death penalty.  The existence of LWOP has also tended 
to increase the severity of even those murder sentences that permit 
parole after some number of years (typically fifteen or twenty five) by 
establishing a political norm that life should mean life—something that 
was never true before (indeed as noted above once murderers in 
California became eligible for parole in 1901, they could be paroled 
after seven years).  In England, the removal of the option of restoring 
the death penalty through the adoption of European-wide prohibitions 
on state execution 134 means that the politics of penal populism has 
focused on extending life sentences. 
The dynamics of abolition and parole since late 20th century have 
undermined that 20th century structure of murder creating a flatter, 
more severe penal sanction that while it rarely executes, increasingly 
foresees those convicted of murder dying in prison.  The defacto collapse 
of the death penalty has not only eliminated the fourth tier of 
aggravated murder (while leaving it spectrally in place to frighten the 
public with the presumed dangerousness of those condemned) but 
through its undermining of parole has transformed first and second-
degree murder into a flat sentence approaching life without parole.  
Only manslaughter remains a tier apart, generating ever greater 
litigation strain for defendants to obtain its prospect of a sentence with 
the promise of an end.  Since manslaughter grounds typically require the 
defendant to blame the victim in large part for the fatal assault, these 
trials inevitably generate even more heat. 
 
134. Optional protocol 6 of the European Charter of Human Rights requires member 
states not only to eliminate the death penalty in their own territory, but to seek its universal 
abolition.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Protocol 6, in BLACKSTONE’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS 204, 204 (P.R. 
Ghandhi ed., 5th ed. 2006). 
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III.  HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: THE FLATTENING  
OF THE LAW OF MURDER 
A.  California 
The U.S. contains fifty-two separate penal systems—counting the 
military as a separate one—and although difficult to generalize, there is 
good reason to fear that murder punishment is flattening these systems 
in both a qualitative and a quantitative sense.  After rising in the 1990s, 
the percentage of persons sentenced to death has declined 
significantly.135  Courts, to an increasing extent, are substituting life 
without parole for death in aggravated murder cases.136  The median 
sentence for murder in a sample of large urban counties between 1990 
and 2002 was 240 months or 20 years.137 
California is clearly at the extreme end of the distribution of states in 
this regard, with over 700 prisoners on death row and tens of thousands 
serving life sentences either for murder or pursuant to its three-strikes 
law.138  When we look at California law, we find a full, late-20th-century 
structure (perhaps the most elaborate in history), with no fewer than 
four levels.  These levels consist of one grade of voluntary manslaughter 
and three grades of murder, i.e., second-degree murder, first-degree 
murder, and first-degree murder with special circumstances, plus the 
possibility of parole for all but the last.  Therefore, a person convicted of 
first-degree murder with special circumstances faces either the death 
penalty or life without parole.139  A person convicted of first-degree 
murder faces a minimum of twenty-five years, plus an additional one to 
five years if the person used a gun, before he or she can be considered 
for parole.140  And finally, a person convicted of second-degree murder 
must serve fifteen years, plus an additional one to five years if he or she 
 
135. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 132, at 3. 
136. In his introduction to a special issue of federal sentencing reporter devoted to 
LWOP, Dean Michael O’Hear notes that LWOP sentences, which hardly existed in the 1980s, 
have tripled since the middle 1990s.  Michael O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life 
Without Parole, 23 FED. SENT. REP. 1, 1 (2010). 
137. BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT FELONS IN LARGE 
URBAN COUNTIES 1 (2006) (including non-negligent manslaughter with murders). 
138. As of January 2010, 697 prisoners were serving life sentences  either for murder or  
pursuant to the three-strikes law.  Furthermore, California had twenty-nine new death 
sentences during 2010 and zero executions.  DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra 
note 132, at 3. 
139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 2008). 
140. Id. § 190(a). 
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used a gun, before the person can be considered for parole.141 
Parole itself has become a legally complicated structure.  Beyond the 
minimums set out in the statutes, administrative guidelines enacted in 
the 1980s establish ranges based on aggravating and mitigating factors of 
the crime or the offender’s record.142  After the completion of the 
minimum sentence for the degree of murder, the weapon, and any 
additional months or years based on the guidelines, the statute states 
that the parole body—known in California as the Board of Parole 
Hearings—”shall normally set a parole release date,” unless the board 
finds that “considerations of public safety requires a more lengthy 
period of incarceration.”143  Since the 1980s, members of the Board of 
Parole Hearings, who are appointed by the governor, have become 
increasingly reluctant to approve the parole of prisoners under life 
sentences for murder and routinely find that the vast majority of those 
eligible are unsuitable under the “unacceptable risk” formula.144  A 1988 
constitutional amendment gives the governor authority to review all 
release decisions made by the board in  murder cases.145  This 
amendment dramatically reduced the number of paroles approved to 
fewer than 100 per year (and in the single digits for some recent 
governors) out of thousands of eligible prisoners.  In 2008 the voters 
adopted a constitutional amendment that establishes a number of rules 
unfavorable to the parole of prisoners.146  These unfavorable rules 
include procedural rules giving victims’ families practically unlimited 
speech rights during the proceedings and others delaying, after a parole 
hearing, the next parole hearing for a minimum of three years (and as 
many as ten), while previously the prisoner had been entitled to an 
annual hearing.147  As the California Supreme Court has recognized, the 
near collapse of parole threatens to erase the distinction between first- 
and second-degree murder.  The court has stated: 
 
The Board’s authority to make an exception [to the 
requirement of setting a parole date] based on the 
gravity of a life term inmate’s current or past offenses 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id. § 3041(a).  The factors are spelled out in CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2282 
(2008). 
143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b); see In re Lawrence, 190 P.2d 535 (Cal. 2008).  
144. JOHN IRWIN, LIFERS: SEEKING REDEMPTION IN PRISON, 10–11 (2009). 
145. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8(b).  
146. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 28, amended by Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008. 
147. Id.  
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should not operate so as to swallow the rule that parole is 
‘normally’ to be granted.  Otherwise, the Board’s case-
by-case rulings would destroy the proportionality 
contemplated by Penal Code section 3041, subdivision 
(a), and also by the murder statutes, which provide 
distinct terms of life without possibility of parole, 25 
years to life, and 15 years to life for various degrees and 
kinds of murder.148 
 
At the other end of the harshness spectrum, executions have ground 
to a near halt.  Only thirteen prisoners have been executed since 
California’s current death penalty law was put in place over thirty-five 
years ago and no execution has taken place in the past five years.149 
The twin collapse of parole, on the one hand, and capital 
punishment, on the other, has rendered California’s elaborate four-tier 
structure of voluntary killing into a two level structure.  If the partial 
defense of manslaughter is successfully invoked, the convicted killer is 
sentenced to a term of years,150 which while much higher than it was 
previously, is fixed and subject to reduction for good behavior at a 
steady rate.  If the killer is convicted of murder, whether of second-
degree, first-degree, or first-degree special circumstances, the killer is 
sentenced to prison in all likelihood for the rest of his life.  This fact has 
returned California to England’s common law situation, where it had 
high fixed penalties for murder.  At least England, in that era, was 
comfortable using executive pardons to reduce the punitive burden 
substantially, while recent  California governors almost never issue 
pardons to current prisoners.  This two-level structure has produced 
conditions that can be described as flat, hot, and crowded. 
The death penalty, which arguably contributes to the dissipation of 
penal heat by focusing an especially severe sanction on a narrow group 
of offenders who are advertised to the public as the “worst of the 
 
148. In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 215 (Cal. 2002). 
149.  See Paul Elias, Cal Case Spotlights Dysfunctional Death Penalty, NEWSDAY.COM, 
Apr. 26, 2010, http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/calif-case-spotlights-dysfunctional-death-
penalty-1.1880491.  The current moratorium has been caused by extensive litigation over the 
lethal injection procedure, but even if this issue is resolved, there is little prospect of a speed 
up.  Id.  The main problem is the appointment of counsel, which takes a minimum of five 
years given the major shortage of lawyers qualified and willing to take capital appeals.  
Experts, including the former California Chief Justice, have described the system as 
dysfunctional.  See Gerald F. Uelmen, The End of an Era, CAL. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 32, 32.  
150. The current terms consist of three, seven, or eleven years.  CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 192(a) (West 2008).   
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worst,” has become a reactor because of the prolonged appellate 
process, which allows  both victims and the media to recycle memories 
of the crime.  Meanwhile, parole—which was designed to channel penal 
heat away from the political center and produce a cooler focus on the 
prisoner’s record in prison, progress toward rehabilitation, and 
prospects if released—has also become a reactor.  The most common 
reasons cited by both the Board of Parole Hearings and the governors 
for finding the prisoner unsuitable for parole concern not the prison 
record, but the circumstances of the crime.151  Designed to distance 
punishment from the heat of the trial, the parole hearing has become a 
repeat trial.152  With manslaughter now as the only real hope (other than 
acquittal) for eventual release from prison, the criminal trial is likely to 
produce even more heat because the partial defense almost always 
requires the defendant to blame the victim for contributing to the lethal 
event. 
B.  England: From Abolition to the Criminal Justice Act of 2003—
Extending Life Imprisonment 
Today, it seems intuitive to many citizens and even lawyers in both 
the U.S. and England that if the death penalty were to be abolished, the 
natural and inevitable replacement would be imprisonment for life (that 
is, until death).  Historically, in fact, life without parole was almost never 
the alternative.  Until 1957, death, in England, was the mandatory 
punishment for murder, but royal pardons were frequently issued and 
those reprieved could expect to leave prison within ten years.153  Once 
the 1957 act created a new crime of aggravated murder, those murders 
that did not meet the capital elements resulted in a nominal life 
sentence.  Nonetheless, the Home Secretary (at the time there was no 
parole board in England) held the discretion to release in the royal 
name.  Most could expect, if they did not succumb to violence, pre-
existing old age, or disease, that they would leave prison after serving a 
substantial but not an endless sentence.154  According to Louis Blom-
 
151.  Irwin, supra note 144, at 119–20. 
152. Proposition 9, the 2008 constitutional amendment that gives the victims extensive 
participation rights in the parole hearing, intensified this situation.  California Proposition 9 
(2008), available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-
proposed-laws.pdf#prop9. 
153. Id.; see also BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 118 (quoting Viscount 
Dilhorne’s estimation that most life sentences last nine years). 
154. As noted above, California permitted murderers to be paroled after seven years 
starting in 1901 until the length was extended in the 1980s.  There was clearly variation among 
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Cooper and Terrence Morris, who as Queens Council and Professor, 
respectively, participated in the national debate on capital punishment 
on the side of abolition, this pattern continued under the nominal 
mandatory life sentence that became the general punishment for murder 
after the complete abolition of the death penalty in 1965.155  Section 1(2) 
of the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act of 1965 permitted 
judges to make a recommendation as to the minimum term before 
which release (on license as parole is known in English law) should be 
considered. 
In England, this system of mandatory life sentences, with the 
likelihood of release after nine or ten years (or perhaps earlier if a 
judicial recommendation for leniency were acted on by the Home 
Secretary), was persevered until the early 1980s when the Thatcher 
government began to emphasize the severity of punishment as one of its 
goals (parallel to the emphasis on penal toughness that was also 
emanating from the Reagan Administration in the U.S.).156  In 1983, 
Home Secretary Leon Brittan announced a new system by which the 
Home Secretary would fix “the tariff.”  This tariff was meant to be a 
period of imprisonment that life sentenced prisoners should serve in the 
interests of retribution and deterrence before they would be considered 
for release by the government.157  For the first time in English history, 
some life prisoners were deemed to be subject to a “whole life tariff”, 
the equivalent of “life without parole” (LWOP) in the U.S. (although 
subject to re-fixing by the government). 
The increasingly punitive approach toward life sentences continued 
into the 1990s and when Labour came into government for the first time 
in more than a decade after the 1997 election.  At that time, it firmly 
embraced the general politics of penal populism, including long 
sentences for murderers.  In 1998 the House of Lords upheld the power 
of the Home Secretary to impose “while life tariff.”  At this point, 
England was clearly moving from mid-20th century individualized 
model of grading, where a life sentence would mean release at the 
discretion of an agency focused on danger to the public toward the 
notion that life should mean death in prison to some murderers, 
 
the states.  H.L.A Hart noted in the late 1950s that US states held murderers in prison far 
longer than England did, citing terms as long as 28 years in Minnesota.  See Hart, supra note 
95, at 440. 
155. Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act of 1965, officially this was a 
moratorium law; abolition became the law officially in 1969. 
156. BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 103.  
157. Id. at 94.  
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regardless of the risk they pose to the public, based on the retributive 
and deterrence concerns of the crime.158 
 In 2002, a pair of court decisions, one from the European Court of 
Human Rights, and a second, adopting the same approach from the 
House of Lords,159 stripped the Home Secretary of his power to set the 
tariff, finding that such power violated the guarantees of Article 5.1 of 
the European Charter of Human Rights.  If the law allowed discretion 
over the length of prison sentences, that discretion had to be exercised 
by a court or by another institution with similar autonomy from political 
pressure.  Ironically, a generation earlier, at the time of the abolition of 
the death penalty, it was judges that were seen as more likely to reflect 
popular anger and anxieties about crime and government ministers who 
were seen as favoring shorter sentences.160  By 2002, this had been 
revered. Influenced by the European Court of Human Rights, British 
courts were increasingly seen as mistrustful of populist sentiments about 
punishment, and more committed to protecting the rights of prisoners.  
The New Labour government, which had pursued longer sentences for 
murder, and feared giving judges full discretion to set the minimum 
sentence for murderers serving life terms, established a new guidelines 
system for life sentences as part of a larger bill packed with “tough on 
crime” elements.161  This bill, the Criminal Justice Act of 2003, was 
designed expressly to “rebalance” the criminal justice system to be more 
in favor of victims.162 
The Act, which the Law Commission described as “one of the most 
important . . . in the history of criminal justice reform,”163 was a large 
aggregation of specific amendments to existing criminal procedure, 
covering many aspects of criminal justice.  Two of its most important 
components dealt with life sentences.  For the first time in English 
history, the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 set specific tariffs within the life 
sentence.164  Judges were required to apply a set of aggravating and 
 
158. Id. at 125. 
159. Stafford v. UK [2002] All E.R. 422; R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, [2003] 1 A.C. 837 (H.L.) [837]; see ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 117–19 (5th ed. 2010). 
160. BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 119–20. 
161. Id.  
162. This is especially true in Schedule 21 of the Act.  See BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, 
supra note 2, at 128.  
163. A New Homicide Act, supra note 24, at 23.  
164. Id. at 19. 
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mitigating factors drawn mostly from the Homicide Act of 1957.165  The 
Act required judges to fit each murder case into one of three categories 
that establish baseline minimum terms of “whole life,” thirty years, and 
fifteen years.166  The Act then stated that judges should apply 
aggravating and mitigating factors to make adjustments.167 
The new scheme normalized the whole life tariff for the most serious 
murders and established fifteen years as the presumptive minimum 
(twelve for persons under eighteen at the time of the crime).168   
Despite the government’s enthusiasm for tougher sentences, an 
indicator of unease at least among legal elites with the resulting changes 
in the punishment for murder came to surface in 2005.  At that time, the 
Law Commission, an independent organization tasked with advising the 
government and Parliament on matters of legal policy, was given a 
mandate to examine whether the law of murder should be revised in 
England.169  The mandate of the Law Commission mentioned four 
considerations motivating a review of the law of homicide.  These four 
considerations were to (a) take into account the continuing existence of 
the mandatory life sentence for murder, (b) provide coherent and clear 
offenses that protect individuals and society, (c) enable those convicted 
to be appropriately punished, and (d) be fair and non-discriminatory in 
accordance with the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Act 1998.170 
At least two, and perhaps all, of the factors point to excessive 
punishment as a problem driving the need to rework the law of 
homicide.  The proper sentence for murder was not one of the subjects 
the Commission was mandated to consider; however, the tone of the 
consultation paper reflected a sense that the unprecedented nature of 
the highly punitive system under the 2003 Act required new 
consideration of the structure of murder, with an eye to allowing at least 
some cases that currently receive a mandatory life sentence and 
mandatory tariff to be sentenced under a different framework. 
 
 
165. Id. at 18.  
166. Id. at 19.  
167. Id. at 19–20.  
168. Id. at 19. 
169. Although penal discourse in England (and the UK more generally, although 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have independent legal systems) is far more politicized now 
than it was a generation ago, there is still a role for criminal law expertise.  See Newburn, 
supra note 26, at  454–60. 
170. A New Homicide Act, supra note 24, at 1.  
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The sentencing guidelines that Parliament has recently 
issued for . . . murder cases presuppose that murder has a 
rational structure . . .  that properly reflects degrees of 
fault and provides appropriate defences . . . .  
Unfortunately, the law does not have, and never has had, 
such a structure.  Putting that right is an essential task for 
criminal law reform.171 
 
Given this problem, the Commission recommended an entirely new 
structure of homicide law, replacing the old crimes of murder and 
manslaughter with a new three-tiered system of first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, and manslaughter.  At the heart of its proposals, 
the Commission identified what it called the “ladder principle.” 
 
Individual offences of homicide, and partial defences to 
murder, should exist within a graduated system or 
hierarchy of offences. This system or hierarchy should 
reflect degrees of seriousness (of offence) and degrees of 
mitigation (in partial defences). Individual offences 
should not be so wide that they cover conduct varying 
very greatly in terms of its gravity. Individual partial 
defences should reduce the level of seriousness of a 
crime to the extent warranted by the degree of mitigation 
involved.172 
 
In its first draft, a consultation paper circulated in 2005, the 
Commission recommended a strict hierarchy of punishment tied to the 
specific homicide crime of conviction and proposed a radical revision of 
the mens rea elements of the crime.  The mandatory life sentence and 
the structure of mandatory tariffs of the 2003 Act were to be reserved 
for the new crime of first-degree murder.  Unlike the Homicide Act of 
1957, which created its aggravated murder crime out of a panoply of 
quite different aggravating circumstances, the Commission initially 
proposed that first-degree murder assure a clear moral distinction to the 
crime attracting such a severe sentence by limiting it to intentional 
killings.173  Such a limit resulted in a far narrower mens rea element than 
either the current English law of murder,174 or than the historical 
 
171. Id. at 3.  
172. Id. at 6.  
173. Id. at 7. 
174. Under the existing English law, an unlawful killing is murder if it is done either with 
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American approach.175 
The consultation paper proposed a new crime of second-degree 
murder, defined as an unlawful killing carried out with one of three 
possible mental states.  These mental states include an intent to “do 
serious harm,” or “recklessly indifferent killing, where the offender 
realized that his or her conduct involved an unjustified risk of killing, 
but pressed on with that conduct without caring whether or not death 
would result,” or, an intentional killing that would otherwise be first-
degree murder but for which the defendant has presented a “partial 
defence” like provocation or diminished capacity.176  Second-degree 
murder would be punished by a prison sentence chosen by the judge up 
to a maximum discretionary life sentence (i.e., one not subject to the 
mandatory minimums of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003).  Finally, the 
Committee proposed defining manslaughter as a killing under one of 
two mental states, either “gross negligence” to the resulting death, or 
with intent “to cause injury or involving recklessness as to causing 
injury.177  Manslaughter would attract a fixed term of years with no life 
sentence option. 
After considerable criticism of the consultation paper by prosecutors 
and judges,178 however, the Commission issued a final report.179  This 
report kept the three-tier structure but considerably reworked the mens 
rea requirements and the maximum penalties so as to greatly diminish 
the hierarchy of punishments and, thus, the ladder principle that it had 
earlier embraced.  The new crime of first-degree murder would include 
intentional killings as well as killings where the defendant acted with an 
intention to do serious injury and was aware that “his or her conduct 
involved a serious risk of causing death.”180  This new requirement had 
 
an intent to kill or an intent to cause serious injury. 
175. This approach mostly relies on the “willful, premeditated and deliberate” formula, 
along with killing in the course of one a list of serious felonies. 
176. Thus, some killings that currently are considered manslaughter would be defined as 
second-degree murder.  Id. at 7. 
177. Id. at 7.  
178. While no mention is made of specific criticisms from the then New Labour 
government, it seems likely that the government which had enacted the Criminal Justice Act 
of 2003 would have been supportive of changes that would have clearly diminished the 
punitiveness of the existing murder structure 
179. See MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE, supra note 22.  
180. Id. at 28.  The Commission reports that opposition to its original proposal for a 
narrower first-degree rule came from courts, law enforcement, and victims groups, including 
the Higher Court Judges Homicide Party, Justice for Women, the Police Superintendents 
Association, and the Association of Chief Police Officers. 
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the effect of keeping killings where the intent was to do serious injury in 
the top murder category, but with the added element that the person has 
an actual awareness of a serious risk of death.  The new crime of second-
degree murder would include killings where the defendant either 
“intended to cause serious injury” (without the additional element of 
the awareness of a serious risk of death) or where the defendant 
“intended to cause injury or fear or risk of injury where the killer was 
aware that his or her conduct involved a serious risk of causing death”, 
or where the killing meets the first-degree standard but the defendant 
“successfully pleads provocation, diminished responsibility or that he or 
she killed pursuant to a suicide pact.”181 First-degree murder would be 
punished by a mandatory life sentence and the mandatory structure of 
tariffs established in the Criminal Justice Act of 2003.  Second-degree 
murder would be punished by a sentence of up to a discretionary life 
sentence (no mandatory minimum) set by the judge, but unlike in the 
consultation paper, the Commission in its final report recommended 
that Parliament create a structure of sentences or tariffs for second-
degree murder.182  Manslaughter would include a killing where the 
defendant was “grossly negligent” with respect to the resulting death, a 
killing where the defendant was intending to cause a non-serious injury 
to the victim, or where the defendant was aware that there was a serious 
risk of causing injury, or where the defendant was participating in a joint 
criminal venture with another participant who commits first or second-
degree murder under circumstances where it should have been obvious 
that first or second-degree murder might be committed.183  Manslaughter 
would also be punished by up to a discretionary life sentence.184 
 
181. Id. at 32. 
182. Id. 
183. Joint criminal venture is a form of liability that under current English law makes 
someone an accomplice to murder if they are an accomplice to inflicting injury and the victim 
is killed by another with whom they are in the joint criminal venture. 
184. In their earlier consultation paper, the Law Commission recommended that 
manslaughter not include the possibility of a discretionary life sentence in order to protect the 
“ladder principle,” linking real differences in the range of punishments to the hierarchy of 
murder crimes.  The Commission cites strong resistance from judges as their reason for 
recommending that the discretionary life sentence remain an option.  “However, most judges 
have indicated to us that they would be uncomfortable with anything less than a discretionary 
life sentence being available for manslaughter.  The importance of reflecting their knowledge 
and experience has led us to depart from our provisional proposal.”  Id. at 177.  Perhaps more 
than any of its other compromises, this seriously undermines the goal of a coherent structure 
to homicide law.  Whether or not it compromises the ability of the law of homicide to 
moderate the tendency toward escalating punishment is not clear, as judges could use their 
discretion to keep such life sentences very rare. 
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The Law Commission proposal would appear to follow the 
American innovation of degrees of murder; however, it defined these 
crimes in quite different ways.  Despite those differences, there is a 
common purpose with the original formation of degrees of murder in 
the early American republic.  That purpose is the aim of both limiting 
the reach of mandatory harsh sentences and assuring that the structure 
of substantive crimes defining those subjected to harsher mandatory 
sentences are morally substantial and socially meaningful. 
The Commission can accurately claim to be both narrowing and 
widening the law of murder.  Indeed, the law will expose to the 
mandatory life sentences of first-degree murder those killers who did 
not intend to do serious injury but who were aware of a serious risk of 
death—killers who can currently only be convicted of manslaughter.  
But a much larger class including those who intended to do serious 
injury, but were not aware of a serious risk of death, could be convicted 
only of a second-degree murder.  By choosing to create a new crime of 
second-degree murder between the old crimes of murder and 
manslaughter, rather than creating a new crime of aggravated murder to 
cabin the mandatory life sentence, the Commission chose (although they 
do not defend the choice in these terms) what I would consider a 
moderating direction to the new structure.185 
The Law Commission recommendations as to the structure of 
murder were never brought to Parliament by the previous government 
and seem unlikely to at present.  However the Report constitutes an 
early expression of concern with the law of murder and excess 
punishment that finds more recent echo in the current government 
where Justice Minister, Kenneth Clark, has issued a policy “green 
paper”186 indicating that he wants to reconsider the mandatory minimum 
system of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 and allow discretion to return 
to judges under the life sentence.187  This change would take some of the 
pressure off of the law of murder, but not all of it, given the likelihood 
that some judges would take the guidelines as new norms as the federal 
judges in the U.S. have apparently done since the mandatory nature of 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was found unconstitutional in United 
 
185. The Report kicked off a considerable discussion among academics as well as judges 
and prosecutors.  See Andrew Ashworth, Principles, Pragmatism and the Law Commission's 
Recommendations on Homicide Law Reform, 2007 CRIM. L. REV. 333; Victor Tadros, The 
Homicide Ladder, 69 MOD. L. REV. 601 (2006). 
186. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
187. Id. at 789. 
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States v. Booker.188 
From a penal heat perspective, the initial proposal in the 
Consultation paper offered a major reform aimed at restoring a ladder 
of punishment to the law of murder and creating a three tier structure of 
murder for the first time in English history—other than the short 
experiment of the Homicide Act of 1957.  The Law Commission makes 
a good case for a three tiered structure of homicide as establishing a 
better balance of grading and moral salience than a two tiered structure 
with murder and manslaughter rearranged.  Although they did not 
frame this in terms of the penal heat regulating function that this article 
advocates, their arguments fit well.  Creating two distinct murder 
crimes, and limiting the flattened and severe life sentences to the more 
serious categories would have given English juries the chance to sort 
murders into two morally salient levels.  The structure proposed in the 
final report continues to offer some of these advantages, although the 
modified distribution of mens rea elements, the invitation for parliament 
to produce a tariff structure for second-degree murder, and the 
discretionary life sentences for manslaughter go some way toward 
diminishing the integrity of the three tier structure.  Indeed, the final 
report appears to be so anxious to avoid any association with the goal of 
moderating penal heat that it goes out of its way to suggest that the new 
structure might result in an overall increase in the punishment for 
murder in England. 
III.  REFORMING THE LAW OF HIGHLY CULPABLE KILLING 
A.  How Many Crimes? 
From the birth of the common law, with Bracton in the 13th century, 
to Herbert Wechsler’s and Jerome Michael’s “rationale of the law of 
murder” to the Law Reform Commission proposals of 2006, there exists 
an essential question in the law of highly culpable killing.  This question 
is whether we should have one, two, three, or more crimes covering 
killings that are especially serious because they are intentional or 
because they contain some other very culpable kind of mental state, like 
intent to injure, or recklessness, as to death.189  As we’ve seen in our 
 
188. 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). 
189. Killing with a less culpable mental state, like ordinary negligence, may subject one 
to a crime like involuntary manslaughter.  I am not counting involuntary manslaughter here 
because such crimes are commonly recognized as fundamentally less serious crimes and 
punished accordingly.  One can argue whether there are sufficient moral differences to 
separate first and second-degree murder, or second-degree murder from manslaughter, but it 
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review of the history, the common law has gone from having essentially 
one such crime (indeed a potentially much more expansive category of 
killing or just felony) to two, with murder and manslaughter, to three, 
with the degrees of murder.  In the late 20th century U.S., the near 
abolition and then “reform” of capital sentencing has produced a fourth-
tier of murder, aggravated first-degree murder or first-degree murder 
with special circumstances as it is called in some states.  At the same 
time, for much of the 20th century, and today, some reformers have 
called for a return to one.190 
I have asserted throughout this Article that one of the key jobs of 
the law of murder is to dissipate the penal heat created both by violent 
crime and by the law’s sometimes severe response to it; channeling heat 
away from the larger structures of law and governance before it distorts 
them, and helping the broader community heal from traumatic events.  
Here, I want to ask of what relevance, if any, is the number of crimes 
available, putting aside for a moment the question of how to define 
them in terms of the major variable of the culpable mental state or mens 
rea.  In this regard, the English Law Commission’s report is particularly 
welcome as a conversation starter because it has explicitly raised the 
question of the structure of the law of murder, one, two, or three tiers; 
as well as many other questions of mental state and defenses more 
common to the genre of criminal law theory.191 
1.  Two is Better than One 
My first proposition is, more than one crime of murder is better than 
just one.  The argument often made for one murder crime is that judges 
can do a better job handling the various aggravating and mitigating 
factors that should grade the seriousness of highly culpable killing than 
any statutory or judicially articulated legal doctrine; whether malice 
aforethought, premeditation and deliberation, or a list of aggravating 
factors.  The well-documented transition of these legal doctrines from 
having a strong normative foundation in the social understanding of 
killing to empty legal ciphers supports this position.  Opponents of one 
crime generally reject the breadth (an inherent vagueness) of a single 
 
is far harder to argue that negligent killing should be grouped with the others. 
190. See BLOM-COOPER & MORRIS, supra note 2, at 175. 
191. They are not alone.  A significant review has also been undertaken in Western 
Australia which alone among the Australian provinces has a three tier structure with two 
grades of murder and manslaughter.  See generally LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA, REVIEW OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE: FINAL REPORT (2007), available at 
http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/2publications/reports/homicide/P97-Forepages.pdf. 
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crime of unlawful killing, thus rejecting the huge discretion that would 
be given to judges in spanning the sentence range for such a crime.  The 
English Law Commission rejected this approach on these grounds: 
 
Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC and Professor Morris’ 
proposal would have the virtue of introducing simplicity 
into the law, and there would be few contested charges. 
However, the proposed offence is excessively broad. It is 
at odds with basic principles of fairness observed in the 
way that other serious offences against the person are 
defined in English law and in almost all other 
jurisdictions world-wide.192 
 
From the penal heat perspective, we can see the problem of one 
crime somewhat differently.  In leaving the jury out of any role in 
grading homicide, this approach starts by rejecting the historic 
institution most associated with the public’s view, the jury, which 
channels the heat of murder and punishment away from the central 
political institutions of the state.  A one-crime model is most likely to 
lodge that power beyond the proxy of the public in some other 
institution, either the judge, a parole board, or the executive through 
clemency.  This institution will inevitably be closer to the center of the 
state.  Even if the jury received the task of deciding on the appropriate 
sentence, as they did between death and prison, in many U.S. states 
under the first-degree murder rule from the mid-19th century through 
1972, the one-crime approach would lose the possibility of putting a 
public name on the level of seriousness represented by a particular 
crime. 
Here, my objection to that argument is not constitutional but 
sociological.  The one-crime model is abandoning any hope for using the 
law to produce a public account of seriousness in the grading of murder.  
I do not mean to idealize juries, or to assume that different kinds of 
legal narratives are not possible.  If penal heat is going to be dissipated 
by the legal processing of a killing in the one crime model, it is going to 
be in the narrative created by the judge and its construction by the mass 
or news media.  Media coverage of crime is of course a complex field of 
its own in criminology, and the way any case is communicated to the 
public can vary enormously.  In a hypothetical one-murder crime model, 
perhaps the mass media and the blogosphere would focus on the specific 
 
192. MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE, supra note 22, at 22.  
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term of years or minimum part of a life sentence that the judge issued, 
and the reasoning behind that decision.  But, in giving up on even trying 
to guide a jury in making part of this decision, the one crime model 
leaves the law as a moral narrative for society largely out of the 
equation altogether.  Having even one distinction, between murder and 
manslaughter, for example, means asserting that sufficient moral clarity 
exists in the society to let ordinary people represented on the jury make 
a major decision reflected in the hierarchy of punishment. 
Having at least two grades of highly culpable killing insists on a 
public hierarchy of moral seriousness and penal severity that we might 
think of as the rudimentary grammar of penal differentiation.  Since the 
law of murder is not simply about murder, but about the calibrating the 
severity of the entire penal system, such a grammar is utterly 
indispensable to a penal culture that can set limits to its own outrage, at 
least in a democratic society. 
2.  Three is Better than Two 
How many grades of murder do you need to effectively radiate penal 
heat?  Here again, the English Law Commission has at least started our 
conversation.  The Commission writes of the numbers problem with 
principles that seem to a have relevance to the penal heat problem: 
 
On the one hand, there is the need to ensure that the 
law is structured in a fair way which accords with 
common sense as well as legal principle.  Important 
differences between kinds and degrees of fault in killing 
must be accommodated within any revised structure. 
On the other hand, there is a need to ensure that the 
law does not become so complex that it cannot be 
applied by juries, especially when they are faced with a 
number of defendants running different defences 
(perhaps in the alternative).  There must be clarity and 
simplicity in the distinctions drawn between offences.  A 
lack of clarity, or excessive reliance on fine-grained 
distinctions, would mean that the prosecution might feel 
compelled in some cases to accept a plea of guilty to a 
lesser offence even when the evidence suggests that D is 
guilty of a more serious offence. 
Having consulted widely with experienced legal 
practitioners, amongst others, we are confident that a 
three-tier structure strikes the right balance.  Most 
significantly, prosecutors, defence advocates and judges 
13. SIMON_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2011  8:21 PM 
2011] HOW SHOULD WE PUNISH MURDER? 1295 
have not objected to the three-tier structure on the 
grounds that it would prove to be too complex.  There is 
already a tiered structure in place for non-fatal offences 
that has for many years been understood in much the 
same way that we anticipate our scheme for fatal 
offences would be understood.  Although the content of 
the non-fatal offences has been frequently criticised, the 
three-tier statutory structure in which they are situated 
has not been the subject of criticism.193 
 
If the goal, from a penal heat perspective, is to create crimes that 
meaningfully sort killings across significant spans of punishment, the 
question might become an empirical one.  The Law Commission, for 
example, argued that a new crime between the most serious murders 
and manslaughter was better than a new aggravated form of murder, 
because most of the action in line-drawing had been on the 
manslaughter, murder line.194  From a penal heat perspective, you want 
as many levels as the culture can sustain at a general level without 
making the process excessively complex.  The early common law, for 
example, seems to have distinguished two modes of killing, the open 
conflict and the stealthy ambush or assassination.  This attack model of 
murder, embodied by the common law,195 was not so much concerned 
with specific intention of the attacker (whether to kill or inflict injury).  
The person who found himself or herself suddenly in armed conflict 
with another person, not a rare event in the Middle Ages, might be guilt 
of a felony, but not murder.  The modern law has replaced the attack 
model with a risk of harm model,196 making certain levels of risk taking a 
form of murder even if there is no intention to kill.  This approach, 
which seems deeply anchored in the importance that contemporary 
society accords to risk is one that lends itself to three grades (first-
degree, second-degree, or manslaughter, or murder plus capital 
sentencing v. manslaughter). 
  
 
193. Id. at 22–23 (citations omitted). 
194. But of course that is simply a product of the fact that it was the only relevant line.  
Had degrees of murder been part of the structure, presumably disappointed defendants 
would have attempted to press the distinction. 
195. Wilson, supra note 28, at 163. 
196. The Model Penal Code makes risk creation a central consideration.  See Binder, 
supra note 43, at 755.  
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The invention of degrees of murder, and with it the three-tier 
structure of highly culpable homicides, speaks to another development: 
the emergence of the prison itself and the possibility of significant 
incapacitation and punishment without execution or permanent exile.  
Under the original common law murder and manslaughter two tier 
system, the two grades meant elimination at one end and virtually no 
punishment at the other (branding on the thumb and a short time in 
jail).  Although contemporary society typically punishes even 
manslaughter with a prison sentence, the logic of having a substantial 
incapacitative sanction short of total elimination and more than 
symbolic punishment remains compelling.  A non-capital sentence for 
murder and real time for manslaughter means the ends are not so 
extreme; the potential for prisons to sustain long term punishment with 
dignity points itself to the feasibility of a three tier structure. 
If our problem is responding too flatly to highly culpable killing, let 
us revitalize what we have and determine what, if anything, we should 
add.  The question of how to redefine first- and second-degree murder 
and manslaughter has understandably attracted the attention of criminal 
law scholars.197  What mens rea should be required to make murder, first-
degree?  Another important question is whether something like the 
felony murder rule be an alternative to a very culpable mens rea.198  On 
the manslaughter line, a good deal of scholarship takes on the important 
question of which partial defenses ought to mitigate murder to 
manslaughter.  Here, I would assert that maintaining a three-tier 
structure is more likely to allow us to work through the serious 
arguments and moral distinctions that would inform those arguments.  
In the end, we need first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and 
manslaughter to make sense of modern killing and to deal with its penal 
heat, but how we define them—while not unimportant, especially to the 
durability of the distinctions—is less important from a penal heat 
perspective. 
How we separate killings among three grades of highly culpable 
homicide crimes is open to considerable debate.  Considerable scholarly 
debate exists over whether first-degree ought to be limited to intentional 
killing with some additional aggravating characteristics of target, motive, 
or method,199 or whether it should include some forms of extreme 
 
197. See generally MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE, supra note 22; 
PILLSBURY, supra note 44. 
198. See generally Binder, supra note 44. 
199. See generally PILLSBURY, supra note 44. 
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recklessness that are similarly aggravated or a felony murder rule.200  
Likewise, considerable scholarship urges the adoption of a limitation to 
the partial defense of manslaughter to only provocations consistent with 
pro-social values.201  There may be an argument that reforming murder 
in one direction or another along these lines of dispute will increase its 
efficacy as a radiator of penal heat.  However, it is also possible that the 
most important thing the law of murder can do is simply have three 
grades of serious homicide, which opens up a broader field of 
differentiation.  How much the substantive law shapes the moral 
imagination of this field of differentiation remains unclear. 
Would four be better than three?  The fourth-tier has been 
associated with the U.S. experiment in reforming capital punishment.  
That experiment has been a failure in creating a more rational death 
penalty, it has also it seems been a failure in managing the penal heat of 
murder.  Indeed by highlighting a series of especially monstrous crimes 
without providing a coherent way to differentiate them, the aggravated 
murder tier may have contributed to the breakdown of the law of 
murder as a radiator.202 
B.  Mens Rea and Meaning 
Mens rea stands at the very heart of modern criminal law analysis.  It 
is therefore not surprising that most academic and juristic debates about 
the law of murder concern the proper mens rea definition for the highest 
levels of murder and those that mark appropriate mitigation to a 
reduced level of murder (typically denominated manslaughter to 
differentiate it).  The major concerns, understandably, have been with 
the justness and efficiency of any particular set of mens rea 
requirements.  Do they separate morally distinct mental states 
associated with killing?  Do they make the job of proof too difficult? 
England has associated murder with two distinct mental states, 
intent to kill and intent to do serious or grievous bodily injury.  
Manslaughter has been marked by the addition of a state of provocation 
(one defined as likely to provoke a reasonable person) or a state of 
extreme emotional disturbance to one of the murder mens rea.  Most 
 
200. See generally Binder, supra note 44. 
201. See generally LEE, supra note 44; Nourse, supra note 88. 
202. It is interesting in this regard that the English Law Commission, in proposing a 
three tier structure, considered and rejected a proposal to make the top tier an aggravated 
murder tier and chose the generic first-degree label instead.  See MURDER, 
MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE, supra note 22, at 24.  
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U.S. states have associated murder with three distinct mental states, 
intent to kill, extreme recklessness with respect to the death of the 
victim, or, in a case where the defendant is engaged in a felony 
inherently dangerous to life, no specific mental state is required.  In 
most states with a separation between first and second-degree murder, 
first-degree murder is defined by one of these mental states with the 
additional finding that the defendant was “willful, premeditated and 
deliberate” with respect to the death of the victim, or, the fact that the 
defendant was engaged in one of a specific set of felonies (e.g., rape, 
robbery, or kidnapping) with no specific mental state respecting the 
victims death.  Manslaughter is defined similarly in England, which 
requires a mens rea appropriate for murder but with the addition of 
provocation or extreme emotional disturbance. 
Contemporary scholars have argued for several possible reforms.  
One persistent theme is the failure of the first-degree formulae to do 
justice to distinctions among murders.  Despite evidence that the first 
statutory effort to frame the first-degree standard in Pennsylvania was 
intended to require juries to find actual deliberation and planning, 
courts quickly moved toward instructions that blurred the line between 
such deliberated killing and intended killing generally.203  As has been 
noted, the Model Penal Code recommended eliminating degrees of 
murder and defining the single grade of murder with a mens rea of 
purpose, knowledge or extreme recklessness with respect to the death of 
the victim.204  A more recent proposal by Samuel Pillsbury is to keep 
degrees of murder with first-degree murder having a mens rea 
requirement of either intent to kill or intent to inflict great violence on 
the victim.  Furthermore, Pillsbury suggests that first-degree murder 
should be linked to a set of aggravating motives, i.e., for profit, to 
further another crime, to influence the legal process, out of hatred for a 
group, or to exercise “cruel power” over the victim.205  Pillsbury defines 
second-degree murder as either intentional killing without the 
aggravating motive, or a form of reckless killing defined around an 
attitude of indifference to human life rather than awareness of risk: 
“The death of a human being by the disregard of an obvious, extreme 
and unjustifiable risk of death, thus demonstrating extreme indifference 
to the value of human life.”206 
 
203. Keedy, supra note 11, at 773. 
204. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (1980). 
205. PILLSBURY, supra note 44, at 183. 
206. Id. at 184. 
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The English Law Commission has recommended introducing 
degrees of murder to England.207  In its consultation paper, the 
Commission suggested that the most serious grade of murder ought to 
be uniquely linked to clear intention to kill.208  The Commission argued 
that framing first-degree murder in terms of intentional killing would 
give it a moral coherence in line with contemporary values.  In its Final 
Report, however, the Commission modified this proposal, adding in a 
new mens rea, intent to do serious injury along with an awareness of a 
substantial risk of death.  Critics of the consultation paper had argued 
that killers who may not intend to kill, but who intend to do serious 
injury to others with an awareness of the significant risk of death, 
especially terrorists, were morally the equivalent of intentional killers. 
Another persistent theme focuses on the over extension of 
mitigation to manslaughter under modern doctrine operative in most 
U.S. states, influenced by the Model Penal Codes “extreme, emotional 
disturbance” standard.  Many contemporary scholars argue that this 
more subjective test makes it too easy for juries to find manslaughter 
even when the reasons that have led to the defendant’s lethal violence 
against the victim do not partake of even the partial justificatory logic of 
traditional “provocation” doctrine.209  This more subjective, more excuse 
oriented standard is said to be particularly problematic for men who kill 
women for attempting to leave even abusive relationships.210  A number 
of academic critics have argued for returning a justification element to 
manslaughter so that the reasons leading to lethal violence would 
correspond to socially and legally wrong behavior by the victim (albeit 
not behavior sufficient to fully justify the killing as in self defense or 
defense of others).211 
Proponents of reform along the lines of new first-degree murder 
standards and new manslaughter standards share a desire to reframe the 
law to reflect contemporary social and legal values, especially equality in 
terms of gender, race, and nationality.  What implications do such 
reforms have for the ability of the law of murder to conduct and channel 
penal heat? 
 
207. See MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE, supra note 22, at 19.  
208. A New Homicide Act, supra note 24, at 7. 
209. See generally Nourse, supra note 88. 
210. Under the traditional provocation standard, the victim would have had to at least 
commit adultery, originally in sight of the perpetrator.  Id. 
211. See generally LEE, supra note 44; PILLSBURY, supra note 44, at 83; Nourse, supra 
note 88. 
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We start with the proposition developed in the previous section that 
differentiation is more important than the particular doctrinal logics or 
cultural meanings assigned to differentiation.  The terms “malice 
aforethought” and “premeditation” have long lost much of their 
doctrinal and cultural meaning, but in so far as they invite decision 
makers and litigants to distinguish among the emotionally charged field 
of murders, they create the potential for dissipating penal heat and 
constructing a grammar of penal moderation, which is left untapped by a 
single category of murder.  When legal reforms introduce new mens rea 
requirements they offer an opportunity to realign this grammar of 
moderation with cultural meanings that have contemporary currency. 
The relationship between such general meanings, and the more 
specific reasoning that decision makers (jurors or judges) will use to 
differentiate specific instances of culpable killing are difficult to know in 
advance and must ultimately be explored with experimental and other 
empirical methods, but some broad hypotheses can be offered here.  It is 
important to remember, however, that the work the law of murder does 
with penal heat is not limited or even primarily constituted by the 
language of the law, but in the performative opportunities that such 
meanings create for the trial process, which is where public responses to 
the law’s handling of specific cases are most likely to be produced 
through the extensive media attention generally given to murder (and 
often only to murder).  Here, I want to consider three reform 
possibilities: (1) defining first-degree murder as intentional killing; (2) 
defining first-degree murder with particularly heinous motives for 
killing, and correlatively, limiting the mitigation of murder to 
manslaughter with socially acceptable motivations; (3) eliminating the 
traditional U.S. “felony murder” doctrine making a killing committed 
during the commission of a statutorily limited set of violent felonies. 
In its initial proposal to create a new crime of “first-degree murder” 
and to limit that crime to intentional killings, the English Law 
Commission cited both cultural meanings and moral concerns with the 
sanctity of life.  Relying on an opinion survey conducted on behalf of the 
Commission by Professor Barry Mitchell,212 the Commission noted that: 
 
[C]onfining “first degree murder” (and the mandatory 
life sentence) to intentional killing will bring the law of 
murder more into line with public opinion. The public 
opinion survey carried out by Professor Barry Mitchell 
 
212. A New Homicide Act, supra note 24, at 259.  
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shows a very high level of agreement that an intent to kill 
is (subject to considerations of excusable motive) an 
indication that the crime was especially serious.213 
 
The Commission also noted the perceived linguistic association of 
murder with intentional killing, citing the views of an earlier commission 
studying revision of the criminal law: “In modern English usage the 
word ‘murderer’ expresses the revulsion which ordinary people feel for 
anyone who deliberately kills another human being.”214 
Closely related to this linguistic association is the moral judgment.  
Moral judgment is associated with the “sanctity of life”, that is, the view, 
grounded in both religious and secular moral thought that: 
 
Life is sacrosanct, there is something that amounts to or 
is close to an absolute prohibition on the intentional 
taking of (innocent) life.  On this view, as it is near 
absolute, respect for the prohibition cannot legitimately 
be a matter of degree.  Consequently, an individual 
instance of, and still less a practice of, deliberate killing 
cannot be ‘traded off’ against the value of achieving a 
supposedly higher purpose, except perhaps in the most 
exceptional of circumstances not relevant here. 215 
 
However in the Commission’s Final Report, as noted above, it 
backed off of the proposal to limit first-degree murder to intentional 
killing, citing primarily opposition from judges, victim groups, and police 
organizations.  Their final proposal, discussed above, which includes in 
first-degree murder killings that while not intentional, were carried out 
with an intent to do serious bodily injury, and an awareness of a 
significant risk of death, was justified primarily on the view that for 
many, these killings are morally indistinguishable from intentional 
killing.  They stated: 
 
[W]e accept the arguments that some kinds of killings 
that were not intended are so especially heinous that 
they should be regarded as, morally speaking, virtually 
indistinguishable from intentional killings (putting aside 
 
213. Id. at 29.  
214. Id. at 30 (quoting CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, REPORT 14, OFFENCES 
AGAINST THE PERSON, 1976, Cm. 7844, at para. 15).  
215. Id. at 31.  
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questions of justification and excuse).  Consultees such as 
Professor Wilson, for example, argued that, ‘some 
reckless killings attract far more revulsion and 
indignation than some intentional killings’.  The degree 
of emotional agitation a killing generates may not in 
itself be a good or reliable measure of how serious that 
killing really is but we have tried to accommodate this 
‘moral equivalence’ argument in the revised structure.  
We have sought to do this by including within first 
degree murder, alongside intentional killing, killing 
through an intention do serious harm aware that one’s 
conduct poses a serious risk of causing death.216 
 
It is noteworthy that the commission cites “emotional agitation” as a 
consideration, something quite close to our conception of penal heat.  If 
the Commission is correct, that a good deal of the public (in England 
but also presumably the U.S.) holds as particularly heinous either the 
deliberate taking of life, or the deliberate infliction of both serious 
injury and a substantial risk of life, defining these mental states as 
elements of the law of first-degree murder should make the overall 
structure of murder better at conducting penal heat than alternative 
formulas that would either further narrow the category (as the initial 
proposal in the consultation paper did) or further broaden it.  Consider 
that these elements will require the prosecution to present evidence that 
demonstrates either an intention to kill, or an intention to do serious 
injury and an awareness of a substantial risk of death.  This evidence, 
whether in the form of statements taken from the defendant, the 
testimony of accomplices, or inferences from the means carried out (for 
example, setting off a bomb on a crowded bus ) will give specificity to 
the claim that a particular murder is of a higher degree of seriousness.  
Likewise, while the defense does not have a burden to disprove an 
element, the practical value for the defendant of presenting evidence 
that contradicts these elements will create an incentive for the defense 
to present evidence that they were not intending to kill and were 
ignorant of the risk that their activity produced.  In short, these mens rea 
elements invite the production of a narrative through the trial that links 
the killing to popularly held emotional responses that render a killing 
more or less productive of penal heat (a process intensified through 
media coverage and elaboration of these narratives). 
 
216. MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE, supra note 22, at 30.  
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Proposals to require additional elements going to the motive for the 
killing should in principle make the law of murder even more efficient at 
regulating penal heat.  Assuming that the motives assigned to first-
degree murder, or, in the other direction, required of the defense to 
mitigate murder to manslaughter, actually align with public emotional 
responses, the resulting trial narratives should provide a richer field of 
differentiations than a simpler mens rea approach.  Or to put it in the 
negative, a law of murder that limits differentiation in murder to mere 
cognitive distinctions (intent, knowledge, awareness of risk, etc.) leaves 
much of the emotion generating meaning of killing outside the trial 
narrative.217  This statement may be even truer with proposals to limit 
manslaughter to provocations or extreme emotional responses that 
accord with socially and legally accepted values.  If a defendant who 
acknowledges intentionally killing the victim wins a reduction to 
manslaughter by proof of a provocation or extreme emotional response 
that is unrecognized as aligned with social and legal values, we may 
anticipate a failure of differentiation in terms of penal heat.  In short, 
the law will draw a difference that does not reflect a meaningful 
distinction, leaving the penal heat of the killing without a narrative of 
moderation. 
Attention to the performative opportunities to create trial narratives 
that are conducive to channeling penal heat also provides insight into 
the doctrine of felony murder from a penal heat perspective.  The 
problem is not that such killings are not as morally heinous as 
intentional killings,218 but rather that they remove the incentive for the 
prosecution to introduce evidence of this motive other than the fact of 
the independent felony, which may require only the demonstration of 
technical elements without accompanying narratives regarding the 
defendant’s intentions with respect to the life of the victim.  The result 
may not be as denuded of emotionally productive meanings as the 
“strict liability” crime some critics assert that felony murder 
 
217. Of course the prosecution may seek to introduce evidence of such motives in order 
to support the cognitive mens rea element, but making particularly heinous motives an 
express element of the crime of first-degree murder both gives these meanings greater public 
salience and mandates their inclusion in the trial process. 
218. Guyora Binder has argued that a properly defined felony murder rule is a way of 
evaluating and expressively sanctioning killing in the course of heinous motive.  “Felony 
murder rules appropriately impose liability for negligently causing death for a very depraved 
motive, as long as the predicate felony involves coercion or destruction, and a felonious 
purpose independent of the fatal injury.”  Binder, supra note 44, at 1060. 
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represents,219 but in easing the prosecutions narrative burdens, the rule 
results in a law of murder that has less penal heat channeling capacity.220 
C.  How Should we Punish Murder? 
The key question here, as the title suggests, is how we approach the 
most serious category of murder, generally “first-degree murder” under 
the three-tier murder manslaughter structure endorsed in subsection 
IIIA above.  How we deal with these worst of the worst crimes is a 
critical anchor for our whole scale of punishment.  Too high an anchor 
will permit or even encourage demands for harsh punishment along the 
whole penal ladder; too low an anchor will eliminate the ladder all 
together, bunching punishments together in a way that may build penal 
heat in the centers of democratic politics where it is likely to produce a 
backlash of penal populism. 
As a historical matter, we are at a moment when capital punishment 
is, or will soon be, off the table as an anchor punishment for even the 
most severe murders.  From a dissipating penal heat approach, this is 
probably a bad thing.  Historically, limiting the volume of capital 
punishments was one of the major drivers of reform of the criminal law, 
and later the law of murder.  Too many executions, or too many 
executive pardons, contributed to the build up of penal heat.  Creating a 
narrower band of capital punishment allowed for a substantial 
moderation of punishments down the ladder.  But, removing completely 
capital punishment (or reducing it so far that its operation become by 
definition freakish and arbitrary) creates a problem by producing 
political demands for longer prison sentences for murder that ultimately 
reset the penal ladder upwards.  The persistence of capital punishment 
as an option for a narrow band of murder cases where the conduct or 
disposition of the defendant was most alarming to the public probably 
contributed to the stability of punishment for much of the 20th century.  
Since its elimination in Europe in the 1970s and its reduction in the U.S., 
the death penalty strikingly has become a minor feature that has gone 
along with a significant expansion in the overall level of punishment.  
Ironically, removing or greatly reducing the availability of capital 
punishment for murder has escalated political demands to increase 
dramatically the overall level of punishment for murder and the overall 
 
219. Id. at 1088. 
220. This result will be more true the more states have elaborated felony murder to 
include crimes that do not speak in their own facility to the existence of morally heinous 
motives. 
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scale of penal sanctions.  However, as a practical matter, capital 
punishment is not an option in England, and, unless current trends 
change dramatically, it is now such a minor a practice in all but a 
handful of U.S. states that it cannot meaningfully contribute to helping 
the law of murder manage penal heat. 
Traditionally, the major alternative to capital punishment for 
murder has been a theoretical life sentence, but in practice, this term has 
varied greatly in its meaning.  The elimination and reduction of capital 
punishment has promoted “Life Without Parole” as the punishment for 
the most serious first-degree murders.  I would argue that despite the 
political popularity of this solution, we move past it for three reasons.  
First, as a practical matter it sets the scale of punishment too high.  Most 
punishment is prison, and if the worst crimes are punished with spending 
the rest of your natural life in prison, this provides virtually no 
constraint on the overall severity of punishment.  Second, as a 
penological matter, operating a prison system with a large number of 
LWOP prisoners is a grave challenge.  I suspect prisons can develop 
dignity and decency enhancing ways to implement natural life sentences, 
but it represents a significant cost. 
To give meaning to a life imprisonment sentence for first-degree 
murder, and to restore the capacity of the law of murder to channel 
penal heat and promote a sense of self restrain in the scale of 
punishments overall, I propose that the U.S. should borrow an idea from 
England and embrace multi phase life sentences that have explicitly 
different penal rationales.  The first phase of any life sentence would be 
a fixed term of years, set either by judges or through a statutory 
guidelines framework with jury involvement, which assures that that 
strong retributive and deterrent concerns associated with the most 
culpable and damaging murders is highly visible.221  We need a better 
word than minimum, which suggests that anyone being released after 
that is getting a very sweet deal.  This phase, which the English call a 
tariff, ought to be called the “penalty phase,” because this is expiation, 
punishment, justice as loss of big portions of one’s life. 
The setting of this penalty phase should be closely associated with 
the criminal trial itself and with the participation of victims.  The harm 
 
221. Indeed, I recognize that many would set these initial terms far higher than I would 
to possibly include a “whole life” sentence for the most extreme crimes which might attract 
the death penalty were it to continue to operate in the U.S..  While I oppose this for the 
reasons cited above, I acknowledge that from a penal heat perspective, a whole life term for a 
limited set of first-degree murders would suit the penal heat regulating role of the law of 
murder. 
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to the victims and their community is righty part of this sentence, and it 
should be delivered by courts following consideration of evidence that 
speaks to that harm as well as the defendant’s culpability in producing it.  
But after that penalty phase of imprisonment, whether it be ten, twenty, 
or forty years, the continued incarceration of the prisoner should be 
based on, and only on, public protection considerations, or 
incapacitation for short.  When it comes to this incapacitation phase, the 
trial is not an ideal time to make the decision about length; some kind of 
review in progress of the sentence is needed.  Wechsler believed this was 
the ideal place for correctional expertise to weigh in on their views.222  In 
the 20th century, these concerns were generally reflected through an 
expert administrative process like a parole board.  Today, however, 
correctional authorities are dominated by a politicized populist 
punitiveness that makes them suspect decision makers.  In some places 
that practice has been abolished and in others, like California, it 
operates under conditions that render it all but a nullity.  Clearly, 
without parole, the modern law of murder has seriously flattened 
toward the high end of severity. 
The European Court of Human Rights has held that where the 
indeterminate part of the sentence is based on incapacitative objectives, 
a court or court-like-body, rather than a political agency, potentially 
focused on popular sentiment, is a requirement of due process and that 
this body should periodically review the risk of release with a 
presumption that release should take place unless the authorities can 
demonstrate a substantial ongoing risk.223  The U.S. ought to follow the 
European lead in this practice as well.  This incapacitation function and 
the risk analysis that goes with it could take the form of a parole board, 
or perhaps a trial court sitting as a release court; but in either course, it 
should be institutionally separated and protected from populist political 
institutions, and it should periodically review the prisoners status with 
the burden on the government to demonstrate unreasonable risk.224  
Likewise, victims whose voices ought to play a significant role in the 
setting of the penalty phase ought to be excluded altogether from the 
incapacitative phase.  Here, after all, the question is not what harm the 
 
222. Wechsler, supra note 111, at 476. 
223. DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT & SONJA SNACKEN, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRISON 
LAW AND POLICY 332 (2009). 
224. There is always some theoretical risk, but given that research has shown remarkably 
low levels of recidivism for prisoners released after murder sentences, there should be a 
requirement that the government prove the existence of unreasonable risk factors at the 
“clear and convincing evidence” level. 
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murder caused, but what chance there is that the defendant would cause 
such harm again.  As noted above, the victim perspective is one of the 
forces arguably flattening the penal grading of homicide.  If the law of 
highly culpable killing is to help us sustain a penal culture that can make 
distinctions and set limits on punishment, it must itself set limits on the 
participation of victims, while not ignoring or dishonoring them.  Victim 
statements should be focused on the initial penalty period of 
imprisonment.  Surviving family members and other victims should be 
able to provide evidence to the judge who is setting the penalty 
sentence, and to any further legal proceeding at which that minimum is 
revisited.  But once the penalty phase has been completed and the 
question is whether or not the prisoner is an acceptable risk to release 
into the community, the victim’s testimony or participation can no 
longer provide factually relevant evidence—no light but only heat.225 
For lesser murders, those defined as “second-degree” under the 
structure endorsed in section IIIA above, the possibility of a life 
sentence should be eliminated altogether in favor of a determinate 
sentence.  There is a strong political pressure today to apply life 
sentencing, at least as a maximum, to second-degree murder as well.  
This was the choice the English Law Commission made (as well as 
calling for Parliament to establish guidelines).  The experience of 
California suggests that parole,226 even if it can be better insulated from 
populist penal pressures, is no reliable basis for actual penal separation 
of first and second-degree murders.  To protect the ladder principle 
essential to the penal heat managing functions of the law of murder, we 
need a significant determinate sentence that can communicate severity 
and establish a meaningful anchor for sentence severity in other crimes. 
What should the scale of determinate sentences for second-degree 
murder look like?  I fear that there is no poetically or morally satisfying 
 
225. It would also provide a benefit to victims to set limits to their participation in the 
later phases of the sentencing, victim advocates have often argued that repeated parole 
hearings are a great strain on victims who understandably feel that fidelity to their loved one 
means presenting the maximum opposition possible at any time parole is a possibility.  Once 
removed as a category however, and on grounds that respect the rightful space of victim 
input, victims would be able to experience a sense of closure as to the pursuit of penal justice 
that closes with the finalization of the minimum sentence.  Excluding victims sounds 
insensitive, but it would actually promote closure by preventing victims from having to relive 
their trauma during periodic reviews of the incapacitative sentence. 
226. Once an innovative way to channel the dangerous penal heat of violent crimes away 
from the centers of government and to create a law of murder as individual as particular 
crimes and criminals, parole has limped into this century deeply mistrusted by the public, 
prone to political control and attack. 
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number once we have abandoned the metaphoric satisfactions of death 
or life.  I would recommend ten years, as a minimum sentence for 
second-degree murder (less than the current, but far more than it was 
set even thirty years ago) with a maximum of twenty or twenty-five 
years.  This scale is appealing on a number of grounds. 
First, ten years is a fit synecdoche for life.  Decades are the 
conventional metric for narrating our lives.  While there is, to my 
knowledge, little if any empirical research on this question, from a 
deterrence perspective, I would suspect that there is a diminishing 
return impact of severe sentences beyond ten years.  Ten describes a 
horizon that most of us can imagine easily (my twenties, my thirties, my 
forties).  For second-degree murder, the presumption should be that the 
retributive and deterrent value of the sanction would also suffice to 
achieve incapacitative goals.  From an incapacitation perspective, ten 
years will take most killers, except for the youngest, beyond the prime 
years for violent crime (generally 15 to 30).  I would recommend judicial 
discretion with a range that went as high as twenty years.  This would 
bring the punishment for second-degree murder up to and perhaps 
beyond the penalty phase for first-degree, blurring the ladder principle 
but not too much.  This sentence should, on grounds similar to the ones 
discussed above for the penalty phase of a life sentence for first-degree 
murder, be set by a judge, in proximity to the criminal trial, and with 
participation by the victims. 
Some might be concerned that at 10 years, my idea that murder 
provides an anchor for the top end of penal treatment might be 
constraining us too much in the punishment of other very serious crimes 
like rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, aggravated assault, etc.  But it 
depends how we conceive of the ladder principle.  One might well argue 
that second-degree murder could share its high rung on the ladder with 
the most life-damaging violent crimes including forcible rape, violent 
kidnapping, and aggravated assault with serious injuries.227 
This discussion brings us finally to the penalty for manslaughter.  In 
one of its least satisfying choices, the English Law Commission decided 
to leave discretionary life as a the maximum sentence for manslaughter, 
thereby destroying the ladder principle with respect to second-degree 
 
227. Since it is the middle tier of killing it may overlap in punishment with other crimes 
that are less serious in consequences but more culpable in the mental state (someone kidnaps, 
rapes and tortures another, but does not kill them may be as heinous as someone else who 
kills recklessly in the midst of a crime. 
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murder and manslaughter.228  Having chosen a lengthy but determinate 
sentence for second-degree murder, it is only sensible to have as a 
maximum, a less severe determinate sentence for manslaughter.  Here I 
would say, if we are truly interested in cultivating penal moderation, we 
might experiment with the common law’s version of benefit of clergy; 
that is, a relatively modest punishment, something perhaps close to the 
overall average for all non-homicide felonies to establish that some 
killing while unquestionably wrong and unlawful, can be sanctioned 
without life diminishing punishment.  This would be especially true if 
current reform proposals, to limit manslaughter to provocations or 
extreme emotional responses that were consistent in their origins 
(although not their results) with contemporary social and legal values, 
were to be adopted.  The woman who responds to a non-lethal but 
repetitive cycle of violence from a domestic partner with lethal force 
that goes beyond reasonable self-defense may require punishment, but 
not life diminishing punishment.  She should not lose her twenties, or 
thirties, etc.  If properly delimited there should be little need for a 
substantial sentence for incapacitation.  This may argue for limiting 
manslaughter to narrower more justification-oriented provocations as 
some scholars have urged. 
The greatest problem with recreating the moral tension and 
grammar that murder and manslaughter had their time, and first and 
second-degree murder in theirs, is that with the exit of the death 
penalty, there is only prison, prison, and prison to mark the dimensions 
of penal severity.  Placing first-degree prisoners under a mandatory life 
sentence may retain some power to differentiate (especially if we 
carefully limit second-degree to a term of years) but we ought to 
consider more innovative ways to mark off the most serious murders.  
Perhaps persons convicted of murder ought to go to distinct prisons with 
distinctive penal regimes designed to reflect both a greater degree of 
opprobrium and sense of a deeper need for penitence.  It is hard for now 
to say what that regime ought to look like in detail, but it must protect 
the dignity of the prisoners and the prison officers that will maintain 
their custody.229  One way to establish such a differentiation in penal 
regimes without risking cruel or degrading punishments would be to 
 
228. MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, AND INFANTICIDE, supra note 22, at 177–78.  
229. It could, but should not necessarily be a supermax style prison, that is a prison with 
isolation, lockdown conditions, limited or no educational and therapeutic programming.  See 
SHARON SHALEV, SUPERMAX: CONTROLLING RISK THROUGH SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
3–7 (2009).  I would imagine something more like a secular monastery with an emphasis on 
reflection and penitence rather than programming and an austere but nutritious diet. 
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improve the reality of rehabilitative programming, education, and 
community connection in our ordinary prisons, which have degenerated 
into “warehouse” like prisons with little rehabilitation or education.  
Second-degree murder prisoners might spend a portion of their sentence 
in the murder prison, while first-degree murder prisoners should stay 
there until the end of the penalty phase of their punishment. 
Another way to re-establish a differentiation in penalty in a system 
with no death penalty and no life without parole sentences might be to 
return to the pre-modern practice of a murder debt (or wergelt) as a 
supplement to the reduced imprisonment for murder that this article 
advocates.  This sum, which would be fixed for all murders (we would 
not want to distinguish among victims in their economic value), would 
begin in prison if renumerative labor was available for prisoners and 
continue after release, although limited in the level of repayment to 
permit some economic margin for the released prisoner’s own needs.  
Given that murder victims are disproportionately poor, such an 
economic supplement, even if paid at a modest rate, would not be 
meaningless.  Moreover, a supplement might go some way to providing 
a sense of justice to victims who might question the elimination of the 
harsher punishments.230 
IV.  CONCLUSION: TURNING DOWN THE HEAT 
Ian Loader and Richard Sparks have observed that criminologists 
now work in an environment undergoing what they call the “‘heating’ of 
crime and crime control.”231  Loader and Sparks go on to elaborate the 
challenges this poses to criminology: 
 
[C]ontemporary criminology is shaped by, and seeks to 
shape a world in which security questions have become 
paramount; a world where crime and punishment tend—-
albeit unevenly—to assume more prominent and 
contentious places in the political cultures and social 
relations of contemporary societies; a world dominated 
and reconfigured by dizzying technological change and a 
‘24/7’ media culture, a world in which the ‘local’ and the 
‘global’ interact in ways that have potentially profound 
 
230. Imagine the different attitude a victim might feel toward learning that the killer of a 
loved one had been, himself, killed in prison, if she were otherwise to receive a continuing 
stream of revenue. 
231. Loader & Sparks, supra note 4, at 2. 
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ramifications for crime and its control.232 
 
Loader and Sparks call upon criminologists to consider what role 
they can play in such a world in turning down the heat, a project they 
call “public criminology?”.  I want to conclude with a similar call to 
criminal law scholars and lawyers.  In such a world it is critical not to be 
naive about what the substantive law of murder, or any other law, can 
do to reduce this heat.  We can be sure that terrible crimes will occur, 
that when the right victims are involved media coverage will be intense, 
and that powerful penal interests groups and politicians will have a 
strong toolkit of ways to use those to turn up the heat.  But law is not 
irrelevant.  The law of murder establishes a template upon which these 
many other forces will play out. 
The law of murder is a proper place for that public criminal law 
work to begin.  In taking up this challenge, if you decide to, I want to 
leave you with features of our criminal law present that should shape 
this challenge.  The first is mass incarceration.  The last time the law of 
murder was on the table, overall sentences were very low and the U.S. 
incarceration rate was nearing a century long low.  Today our prisons 
are becoming dangerously overcrowded in many states, and the health 
costs that they are generating threaten to eat up all our badly needed 
capital for public investment.  The overall penalty structure in the U.S. 
is simply too high, and we should be unembarrassed to assert that 
reforming the law of murder is about reducing it.233 
Second, we must recognize that an extreme logic of incapacitation 
has now replaced not only rehabilitation but also retribution and 
deterrence.  The bad news is that in this extreme form it has degraded 
both prisoners and our laws in the pursuit of an elusive kind of total 
security.  Keeping people convicted of murder in prison forever as a way 
of protecting against future murders is a foolish and futile project that 
ignores the fact that that all but a tiny percentage of murders every year 
are committed by people who have not been convicted of murder and 
imprisoned.  It is the equivalent of the drunk who looks under the 
lamppost for his keys because it is light there.  It is the killers we do not 
know yet against whom the most meaningful preventive measures can 
 
232. Id. at 17. 
233. This point is where my high admiration for the work of the English Law 
Commission gets weaker.  In their final report, the Law Commission was anxious to show that 
it was not keen to reduce sentences and goes out of its way to suggest that it overall change 
proposal might increase overall punishment for murder. 
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be taken and while some of them are in prison, (for other crimes than 
murder) many are on the streets.  The good news is that we have more 
reason to be confident that we have effective police strategies that to 
help make people safer than we had in the past.234  The law of murder 
can help reintroduce retribution and deterrence to the process of 
punishment.  It can also help us acknowledge and meet the demand for 
incapacitation.  If we can use more innovative policing strategies to 
continue the remarkable reduction in homicides that we have seen since 
the early 1990s, the public will be less committed to life exhausting 
prison sentences for murder as the source of security. 
Third, the law of murder should hold near its heart the obligation to 
both victims and defendants to uphold their dignity.  Dignity, which can 
be understood as a fundamental right to being recognized as a person 
“having a story of one’s own,”235 is perhaps the one right that a murder 
victim still has at stake even after death.  To be killed by someone, 
unlawfully and with a highly culpable mental state, is to be denied your 
humanity as well as your life.  The successful prosecution for murder 
and an appropriate punishment for the culpable killer is, in fact, a way 
to restore that dignity, something that will be quite real to the murder 
victim’s survivors and, thus, about which the victim cares.  As moral 
philosophers have long appreciated, the killer has also lost their dignity, 
by putting their own humanity into doubt.  The point of punishment 
should also be to restore that dignity to the convicted person who is 
willing to seek it.  A hot, flat law of murder is less capable of assuring 
the dignity of either victims or their killers than one with a morally 
meaningful set of substantive murder crimes attached to a proper ladder 
of punishment. 
 
 
234. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 76–81 (2007). 
235. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 70 (2007). 
